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ABSTRACT 
 
The study of the regulation of the electric power industry is important to 
understanding the role of the industry in the economic development of this country.  
These essays attempt to clarify the analysis and accentuate the salient features of 
regulation and the restructuring of the electric power industry and the organization of the 
firms that make up the industry. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ISSUES IN ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING 
 
As of 2007 the state of restructuring in the United States is uncertain.  The paradigm 
for restructuring, California suspended its transition plan.  And what restructuring has 
occurred in the rest of the country is partial and less certain.  But the case for 
restructuring is not closed.  Regulators in many states are continuing to manage the 
transition to a more competitive generation market, albeit with trepidation.  There is also 
a lack of commitment to continue restructuring that is necessary to minimize the 
regulatory costs of restricted markets.   
It has been over 80 years since the imposition of major federal regulation of the 
electric power industry.  From the early 1990's until 2005 Congress undid most of the 
regulatory changes imposed by past federal administrations.  While this is the most 
important initial step, undoing 80 years of the industry's structural sclerosis and 
regulatory intransigence1 is going to take more than 2 years.   
Electricity has a long history in the United States.  Due to the peculiar nature of 
electricity generation, regulation of the industry started shortly after the industries 
creation.  While early restructuring was limited to the states, perceived widespread abuse 
of the holding company structure lead to the passage of the Public Utilities Holding 
Companies Act of 1935 (PUHCA).  PUHCA was broadly opposed by investor owned 
utilities who saw the regulation as a major curtailment of their business practices.2 By 
the 1970s the industry had changed due to a combination of technological innovation, 
environmental regulation, and price shocks.  These forces combined with monolithic 
 
1 Gordon 1992 
2 Trebing 2000 
2regulation held over since the 1930s created a demand for regulatory change by the 
electric power industry.  The result was the passage of the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policy Act (PURPA) in the late 1970s and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) in the 
early 1990s.  The electric power industry endorsed the laws as they mitigated the 
excesses of PUHCA.3
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), following a mandate in the 
EPAct, issued Orders 888 and 889, mandating the unbundling of generation and 
transmission and their provision at non-discriminatory rates.  Subsequently in the early 
nineties, many states began planning to implement restructuring.  Twenty two states 
passed restructuring legislation and three states passed regulatory orders designed to 
transition electricity markets in the states to competitive wholesale electricity generation. 
There has been a significant amount of research and commentary on electricity 
restructuring.  A consensus has developed on what is necessary to implement competition 
in electricity markets, but there is disagreement among scholars about some of the details 
of restructuring.  This essay attempts to clarify the disparities between perspectives and 
highlight the salient features of a successfully restructured generation market.  
 
Who and Why of Restructuring 
 
An electric power industry is important to the sustained development of any industrial 
nation.  Its importance is understated in that society currently has poor substitutes for the 
electricity in the provision of readily accessible energy; electric power's value is derived 
as a substitute for less convenient alternatives.  Its ready acceptance as the clean 
 
3 Trebing 2000 
3alternative made it an early candidate for a combination of regulation and subsidy at 
every level, especially after 1910.4 Scale economies added to this, but as the industry 
matured, regulation prevented the industry from adapting and developing into its most 
efficient form.  Because of state regulation, the industry adapted in separate state and 
regional forms that impose costs and dispense rents beyond other forms of market 
allocation.  The total effect has been to cause systematic price differences that cannot be 
mitigated through arbitrage. 
In the last fifteen years the federal government and the states began to restructure 
their regulatory environments in response to observed differences in average prices 
across states, independent of fuel costs.  Especially from 1996 and on, the differences and 
changes were patently obvious in the state level data.  The states have proceeded along 
two paths: either they have restructured regulation or they have continued with their 
chosen level of regulation. 
 
4 Jarrell 1978 
4Table 1.1 
Restructuring Versus Non-Restructuring States With Respect to the Mean 
 Year       
Legislative 
Outcome Variable 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
No 
Restructuring 
States With Less 
Than Avg Costs 18 17 20 18 18 18 18 
States With More 
Than Avg Costs 8 9 6 8 8 8 8
States With Less 
Than Avg Rev 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
States With More 
Than Avg Rev 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Restructured 
States With Less 
Than Avg Costs 13 10 12 12 12 12 12 
States With More 
Than Avg Costs 11 14 12 12 12 12 12 
States With Less 
Than Avg Rev 11 10 10 10 12 12 13 
States With More 
Than Avg Rev 13 14 14 14 12 12 11 
Source: EIA         
The main incentive to restructure came from notable differences in prices between 
various states.  Table 1.1 contains the number of states greater than or less than the mean 
average cost and average revenue from 1996 through 2002.  For the non-restructuring 
states, a significant proportion had average costs less than the total average through 2002.  
These states had the least incentive to restructure.  18 of 26 had less than average costs, 
while 8 of 26 had greater than average costs.  Looking at the restructuring states, it was 
split down the middle.  Based on costs, most states with the lowest costs never bothered 
to restructure, while the states with the highest costs generally did restructure.  Looking at 
average revenue, the best proxy for actual prices in the states, of the states that did not 
restructure, only 4 had higher than average prices from 1996 through 2002.  For the 
restructuring states, it is heavily dependent on the year.  Three quarters of the high priced 
states restructured, while a third of the low priced states would restructure.  Costs and 
prices were both driving restructuring through the 90s.  If only costs were driving 
5restructuring, then there would be no difference in restructuring between states based on 
average revenue and costs. 
Table 1.2 
 
Average Revenue by Sector and Fuel Costs 
 Year  
Legislative 
Outcome Variable 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Avg 
Average Revenue 
(cents/kWh): 
Residential 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.7 7.9 7.9 8.1 7.7 
Average Revenue 
(cents/kWh): 
Commercial 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.8 6.8 7.0 6.7 
Average Revenue 
(cents/kWh): 
Industrial 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.6 
Average Revenue 
(cents/kWh): All 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.5 6.7 6.3 
N
o
R
es
tru
ct
ur
in
g
Fuel Cost 
(cents/kWh) 2.8 2.7 2.1 2.1 3.1 3.3 2.8 * 2.7 
Average Revenue 
(cents/kWh): 
Residential 9.4 9.5 9.3 9.1 9.1 9.4 9.2 9.4 9.3 
Average Revenue 
(cents/kWh): 
Commercial 8.1 8.1 7.9 7.7 7.7 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.0 
Average Revenue 
(cents/kWh): 
Industrial 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.5 6.2 6.0 6.1 5.6 
Average Revenue 
(cents/kWh): All 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.5 8.1 7.9 8.0 7.7 
R
es
tru
ct
ur
ed
Fuel Cost 
(cents/kWh) 4.2 4.8 3.9 3.7 5.5 6.1 4.4 * 4.7 
* Data is unavailable after 2002 
Source: EIA 
In the nineties a change in the structure of the electric industry became inevitable.  
Looking at the difference in average revenue5 beginning in 1996 and through 2003 in 
Table 1.2 and the figures below, there were strong incentives for states with the highest 
electric rates to implement restructuring. 
 
5 Average revenue is a proxy for price in the states. 
6Average Revenue: All Sectors
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Looking at the mean average revenue across all sectors there is almost a cent and a half 
difference in average revenue between the states that restructured and those that did not.  
Note that restructuring means that the state enacted restructuring legislation between 
1996 and 2001.  Non-restructuring states may have conducted studies, but no serious 
efforts to restructure were completed.  No state has enacted restructuring legislation since 
2001 and a few have rescinded and scaled down restructuring in response to the 
California debacle. 
 
7Brief History of Electric Utility Regulation6
The electric utility industry has been regulated since its inception in1879.  The states 
granted franchises for incorporation while the municipalities awarded franchises to firms.  
Substantial competition occurred at the municipal level under the franchise scheme.  
While today franchises are exclusive and designed to limit certain forms of competition, 
there is no indication that municipalities limited the number of franchises it was willing 
to grant.  This was especially true in larger cities.7
While there are economies of scale in regulation and state level regulation could be 
more efficient that local regulation, Jarrell8 suggests that the move from municipal to 
state regulation ultimately benefited producers.  This is especially obvious as the utilities 
changed their stance on state regulation after 1910, going from opposition to 
endorsement.  Beginning in 1907, New York State, Wisconsin, and Georgia created the 
first statewide regulatory commissions.  Most states followed Wisconsin's model.  Today 
almost every state has a regulatory commission that is responsible for monitoring the 
behavior of public service entities within the state. 
The Great Depression brought substantial changes to the electric power industry 
through regulation.  Prior to the Depression there was substantial concentration in the 
electric power and natural gas markets.  A substantial amount of speculative behavior 
occurred at this time through the holding companies that controlled a substantial portion 
of production in parts of the United States.  Only four states directly controlled the 
 
6 Viscusi et al, Demsetz, and FERC 
7 In 1887 there were six electric light companies existing in New York City.  Chicago had 45 different 
firms with the right to operate in 1907.     
 
8 Jarrell 1978 
8activities of holding companies as of 1929: New York, Massachusetts, Alabama, and 
New Jersey.9
Discussion in the early thirties concerned the ability of states to regulate interstate 
holding companies.  Many did not consider the holding company equal to a public utility 
in a legal sense because the holding company did not have the electric power and it did 
not serve the public.  The states often extended the definition of a public utility for 
regulatory purposes to include the controlling holding company by stock ownership.  But 
despite extending the definition to include holding companies on paper, they did not 
regulate holding companies in practice.  The United States Supreme Court only allowed a 
very general indirect regulation of the holding companies by the states, leaving many 
substantive issues undefined.  The Illinois Supreme Court held that the regulator does not 
have general discretion in the regulation of the holding companies, or even the utilities 
directly: 
 
The Commission is not the financial manager of the corporation and it is 
not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the directors of the 
corporation; nor can it ignore items charged by the utility as operating 
expenses unless there is an abuse of discretion in that regard by the 
corporate officers.10 
Subsequent decisions by the United States Supreme Court would grant regulators the 
authority to scrutinize the interactions of holding companies and their utility subsidiaries.  
 
9 Lilienthal 1929 
10 State P. U. C. ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield G. & E. Co.,291 Ill. 209, 234, 125 N. E. 891 (1920), in 
Lilienthal 1929 
9The courts did not allow a per se justification by regulators to disallow costs incurred by 
utilities in their dealings with holding companies, only when those costs were incurred in 
bad faith.  The states did not have jurisdiction over "imprudent or improvident 
[securities] issues" by holding companies, with the exception of liens.  By statute in many 
states, regulators were allowed to regulate the acquisition of capital by holding 
companies.  Ultimately the courts held that consumers were to be protected by the 
vigilance of the commissions regardless of ownership or the financial position of the 
owners.  As of 1929 the status of the state regulation of holding companies was as 
follows: 
 
1. Direct regulation was negligible, but there were instances of it. 
2. Relations between holding companies and operating companies were 
regulated by control over all contracts between the operating company and 
its parent company which may affect rates, or service to the consumer. 
3. Acquisition by holding companies of operating company securities was 
regulated in many states, by the commission's power to prevent such 
transfers. The scope of the power was an issue. 
4. The states had no control of holding companies' non-lien securities. 11 
By 1931 the Supreme Court had ruled that regulators had to effectively separate 
intrastate from interstate "property, expenses, and revenues" in determining the rate base 
allowed.12 The courts and various commissions held that the state regulators were 
 
11 Ibid. 
12 Editorial, Harvard Law Review 1931 
10 
qualified to deal with the holding companies with regard to the regulation of public 
utilities.  New York led the initiative by giving regulators access to data and records as 
they pertained to the controlling holding companies and strengthening the regulators' 
power to control the relations between the utilities and holding companies. In the United 
States Senate, the Couzens bill was introduced to allow for the interstate regulation of the 
transmission of electricity.  But ultimately the courts left the regulation of public utilities 
and indirectly their holding companies to the states, as the regulation was viewed as 
principally a local problem.13 State regulation was viewed as failing despite the 
aforementioned control exercised by state regulators. 
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) was a measure enacted 
to prevent what was seen as unnecessarily risky behavior on the part of highly 
concentrated firms and the continued merger of firms for the purposes of market 
foreclosure.  One commentator notes,  
 
The utility holding company structure undoubtedly helped disguise 
unscrupulous practices, such as the bilking of subsidiaries through service 
contracts, inappropriate depreciation techniques, and the use of inflated 
property values, all of which contributed to the collapse of the holding 
companies.14 
The act required firms to receive Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
approval before merging or making acquisitions.  It also prevented non-utilities from 
 
13 Lilienthal 1931 
14 Geddes 1996 
11 
owning utilities, and it required firms to incorporate in the states in which they operated 
so that the state could regulate the firms as necessary. 
Regulation of electric power at the national level was originally entrusted to the 
Federal Power Commission (FPC).  The FPC was founded in 1920 to coordinate 
hydroelectric projects under federal control.  Originally the commission consisted of one 
executive secretary that operated at the convenience of three cabinet secretaries: war, 
interior, and agriculture.  His staff was derived from the staffs of the three cabinets, 
making for an ineffective office.  In the Federal Power Act of 1935 the scope of the 
commission was extended to include the interstate transmission of electricity and natural 
gas.  Through the sixties, resulting from several Supreme Court decisions, the power of 
the commission was extended to intrastate transactions, as long as the firms that were 
parties to the transactions transmitted power or gas across state lines.  In 1977 the FPC 
was reorganized as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).   
 
Regulation Under Increasing Returns to Scale 
 
From the inception of the industry, it has been held that vertically integrated power 
production—power generation, transmission, and distribution—was a decreasing cost 
industry and therefore required significant regulation.  Even at the municipal level, 
exclusive territories were granted to firms in order to promote efficiency in production 
and distribution, but often the exclusive territory was a de facto arrangement. 
12 
Despite the restructuring that occurred in the 1930's, there was very little remotely 
competitive about power markets until recently.  Joskow notes15 that throughout the 50's 
and 60's investor owned utilities (IOUs)16 earned rates of return that, while regulated, 
still granted them rents due to the low and stable price of fuel.  IOUs often granted rate 
reductions without incentives from regulators.  Demand grew continuously at about 7 
percent per year.17 
Beginning in the early 70's and coinciding with energy shocks, utilities began 
requesting frequent and significant rate increases due to increased fuel prices.  At the 
same time they began searching for alternatives to the fossil fuel generation that had been 
common up until then.  One of the major new technologies was nuclear power 
generation.  There was also the realization that larger central generating facilities were 
more efficient.  With the need to increase capacity, joint ownership of capacity became 
common.   
Through the late 60s and early 70s IOUs began investing heavily in new nuclear 
generating capacity.  But there was a decline to 1.6 percent per year in peak demand 
growth.18 Consequently nuclear programs stalled as the decade ended.  Utilities were 
left holding or building significant capacity even while fuel prices began to fall through 
the mid 80's.  Although prior to the fall in energy prices, estimates of potential crude oil 
costs had reached $100 per barrel.   
 
15 Joskow 1989 
16 Throughout this paper the focus is tacitly on IOU's and their regulation.  Nothing meaningful has 
changed about the structure of municipal and cooperative power markets.  They generally have exemption 
from most FERC oversight.  
17 Studness 1995 
18 Studness 1995 
13 
Despite the excess capacity, utilities still enjoyed the protections of regulation, with 
its incentives.  Even as the energy crisis ebbed through the 80's, producers continued to 
invest heavily in new capacity.  In a competitive environment the fall in fuel prices in the 
mid-eighties would have driven the price of electricity down to a level that would have 
made continued investment in new capacity unthinkable.  Managers failed to note this 
and regulators ignored it throughout the eighties.19 
The Importance of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act (PUHCA) 
 
PUHCA was an additional hindrance to the development of an efficient electric 
power market.  While a few holding companies were involved in less than reputable 
transactions that ultimately caused the demise of the holding company, some of the 
restructuring under the holding companies was a transitory, competitive response to the 
prevailing corporate structure: a reorganization to effect a more competitive, efficient 
industry.  This view implies that PUHCA halted beneficial industry change in mid 
transition, leaving the industry in regulation induced limbo until recently.20 
There were considerable restrictions placed on holding companies that could not 
qualify for an exemption to PUHCA.  If a holding company was subject to enforcement 
under PUHCA: 
 The holding company had to operate as a single integrated entity 
 SEC restrictions mandated that transfers between subsidiaries be made "at 
cost." 
 
19 Studness 1995 
20 Gordon 1992 
14 
 The holding company had to engage only in activities related to the provision 
of electricity. 
 Public utilities could not own both gas and electricity. 
 The SEC had to approve all mergers and acquisitions and issuances of 
securities, as well as regulating the financial structure.21 
As it became apparent to experts in the regulation of electric utilities that the industry 
was changing, PUHCA was acknowledged to be a major cause of continued inefficiency 
in the industry.  Many aspects of regulation have changed since 1935, and financial 
analysis and accounting standards have evolved.  PUHCA has been credited with limiting 
the choice of organizational structure, restricting the market for corporate control, and 
limiting the ability of utilities to diversify across regions and industries.  By not being 
allowed to adjust to modern market conditions, utilities were handicapped by 
inappropriate regulation and oversight and were exposed to suboptimal incentives that 
ultimately raise cost to the final consumer.22 PUHCA was an example of the problems 
associated with regulation: a resistance or inability to change to accommodate market 
forces.   
While legislative change has been slow, Congress has not been deaf.  With the 
passage of the Electricity Policy Act of 2005, PUHCA was effectively repealed. 
 
21 Joskow 1989 
22 Geddes 1996 
15 
Transition to Competitive Wholesale Generation Market 
The movement toward restructuring came with the passage of the Energy Policy Act 
of 1992 (EPAct).  EPAct gave the FERC the authority to design a plan to proceed with 
power market restructuring throughout the United States.  The plan came to fruition with 
Order 888 and 889.  Order 888 required utilities to establish procedures for implementing 
non-discriminatory transmission tariffs with the intent of promoting wholesale generation 
competition—effectively procedures for implementing wholesale wheeling nationwide.  
Order 889 was designed to establish the Open Access Same-Time Information System or 
OASIS.  OASIS allows for wholesale generators access to real-time information about 
pricing, demand, and capacity with the intention of facilitating wholesale competitive 
markets.  These changes were necessary to develop a competitive, interstate market for 
wholesale power.  Non-discriminatory tariffs are necessary to prevent vertically 
integrated utilities from exercising discriminatory market power.  Additionally real-time 
information eliminates the central problem associated with the electric power industry: 
the continuous, physical market clearing requirement imposed by technology.  Without 
real-time information, opportunities for the exercise of market power would develop as 
markets are unable to adapt symmetrically to changing conditions.  This is the current 
problem with retail electric competition without real-time pricing. 
While EPAct did not grant FERC the authority to impose retail wheeling—allowing 
markets to develop independent of regulatory jurisdiction and transmission ownership—
several states have implemented their own deregulatory schemes, most infamously 
California, although most of the others have not faired as badly for various reasons.  By 
16 
February 2003 significant portions of the country were actively restructuring retail 
electricity markets.23 The entire northeast—west to Illinois and north of North Carolina 
with the exception of Vermont, West Virginia, Kentucky, Indiana, and Wisconsin—was 
actively restructuring in 2003.  Other states that restructured are Texas, Arizona, and 
Oregon.  The rest of the country either has delayed restructuring or is not currently 
interested in restructuring at this time.  California is notable for suspending restructuring 
after being one of the original states to restructure. 
 
Issues: 
 
Most past analysis has looked at persistent issues that emerge with restructuring: 
concentration and market power; the consequences of market trading of electricity; 
transition costs; organization and governance of transmission; and the adequacy of 
consumer and environmental protection.24 These issues will form the core of any 
analysis of restructuring. 
Given that states appeared to be intent on restructuring their energy markets, it is 
important to understand the peculiar nature of electric power generation.  On a broad 
level, the market is structured in three tiers: generation, transmission, and distribution.  
No restructuring plan has suggested that transmission and distribution should be 
restructured.  It is assumed best to run transmission and distribution as franchise 
monopolies, with regulation.  Due to congestion, there is a significant body of analysis on 
 
23 EIA 
24Trebing 2000 
17 
the proper role of the regulator in determining the efficient provision of transmission 
infrastructure. 
Joskow acknowledges that electricity has its own unique attributes.25 Electricity is 
very difficult to store at low cost and generally requires "just-in-time" production and 
consumption.  There are very low short run demand and supply elasticities resulting in 
very volatile spot markets.  Due to the physics of electricity, there are opportunities for 
market power at different points in power networks that can adversely affect market 
prices independent of electricity demand.   
There is a consensus that the restructuring that is occurring is not deregulation. 26 
Trebing outlines the general features of restructuring legislation.27 The states began to 
restructure beginning in 1996 with Rhode Island followed by California, Pennsylvania, 
and Massachusetts.  Generally the legislation included some mechanism for stranded cost 
recovery.28 Most laws have included price caps on service for limited periods.  And they 
required some separation of transmission and distribution from generation at the state 
level.  While they differed in the details, most restructuring initiatives would include 
variations of these themes. 
In restructuring, the markets developed various participants.  Restructuring has given 
rise to marketers, brokers, and resellers who operate within spot and futures markets, 
regionally, to deliver power at something resembling competitive prices.  As these are 
economic agents, they have incentives to optimize given the structure created by 
regulators and legislators in the states.  Any analysis of restructuring issues has to focus 
 
25 Joskow 2003 
26 Hogan 2002, Trebing 2000, Wolak 2001, and Joskow 2003 
27 Trebing 2000 
28 Stranded costs are the difference between the accounting value and market value. 
18 
on the incentives of these agents.  As an example, a lack of bilateral, real-time 
information would allow a broker or reseller to take advantage of short-term market 
asymmetries—allowing for rent-seeking when the planned "market" does not allow for 
offsetting behavior by other financially interested parties. 
 
Transition Costs: 
 
Restructuring is not free of cost.  Transition costs accrue because the optimal 
decisions made when the states' markets were heavily regulated are different from the 
optimal decisions made under less stringent regulation.  The decisions required for 
capacity planning require years to implement, as seen in the case of nuclear generation.  
As a result, regulators and politicians have felt compelled to smooth the transition from 
regulation to competition for the incumbent firms.  While regulators and incumbents have 
been in favor of transition charges placed on market participants, competitors who are not 
entitled to the transfers have opposed them as anticompetitive subsidies for incumbents.  
Another possible reason to oppose the transition charge is because the investments 
themselves may not have been prudent, even when utilities faced the capacity uncertainty 
described.  And there is anecdotal evidence that transition charges have thwarted the 
development of competitive generation.   
Transition charges are principally tied to the issue of the recovery of stranded costs.  
The term "stranded cost" is unique to the electricity restructuring, but it is essentially a 
term to describe sunk costs, or those costs incurred by the firm that are not taken into 
account when making the decision to produce or not.  Stranded costs in this case include 
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investments in capacity made during the late seventies and eighties that were made with 
the expectation of high fuel costs.  Many are nuclear investments but there are some that 
include plants fired by alternative fuels and coal. 
The idea behind stranded costs is that the firm is unable to recoup the cost of capital 
as the price of electricity falls, or the returns to capital fall below the cost of capital.  But 
to further complicate the problem, utilities complain that the decision to incur these costs 
was made while the utilities were still under the regulator's oversight and were therefore 
prudent investments when they were made, given information about future fuel costs.  
Utilities also claim that a "regulatory compact" exists or existed with regulators and that 
these costs were incurred under the full and justified expectation that rates would be 
adjusted to allow for the recovery of construction costs. 
Several authors argue that the argument for the recovery of stranded cost is dubious at 
best.  There is no economic efficiency argument that can be made regarding the recovery 
of stranded cost. 29 The basis for any argument is equity and morality.  While the value 
of capital falls as a result of a decline in expected future returns relative to book value, or 
the accounting or historical value of capital, this does not affect the decision whether the 
utility will continue to produce or not.  It does have an effect on the market value of the 
utility, but it does not impact the future solvency of the firm. 
As regulatory policy, Maloney and Sauer suggests that firms should not be allowed to 
collect stranded costs.30 The role of the regulatory commission is to act as a proxy for 
market forces31—their decisions should approximate what would prevail if competitive 
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31 Actually, the role of the regulatory commission is to as an agent of the legislature, with its own 
incentives, but that issue will be addressed later. 
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markets were available.  The regulator acts in response to decisions by utilities, making 
decisions designed to approximate market outcomes.  The utility still acts as a profit 
maximizing firm, with both quality and rate of return determined by the regulator.  
Further, as investors voluntarily accept risk in a market environment, their return is 
determined by market conditions and firm decisions.  Consumers, or their agents, do not 
voluntarily accept risk by contracting with monopoly utilities.  It is unjust for consumers 
to bear risks that should be borne by investors making voluntary decisions.  Market data 
bears this out.  Maloney and Sauer cites two studies that show utility bond rates in excess 
of government bond rates.  If investors had not expected risk, then bond rates should not 
have been different.  It is irrelevant whether the risk is a result of ex ante firm response to 
regulators' restructuring or other unforeseen circumstances, the premium exists in either 
case.  It is improper for government to compensate producers for firms' mistakes or 
regulatory uncertainty. 
Furthermore, some of the investments in capital made by utilities may not have been 
prudent.  Studness notes that, even after fuel prices fell in the mid eighties, many utilities 
continued to expand capacity. 32 Based on unrealistic expectations of future demand, 
utilities continued to invest in capacity even though current fuel prices had fallen – they 
never heeded standard market signals.  The new capacity caused an 18 percent decline in 
the book value from 1974 to 1983, yet they continued to invest in capacity. 
The arguments in favor of stranded cost recovery are less convincing.  One line of 
reasoning holds that, if stranded costs cannot be recovered, then the quality of utilities' 
debt will fall, raising the cost of capital to utilities.  Maloney and Sauer shows us the 
fallacy of the reasoning.  The argument implies that the risk inherent in the electricity 
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production was being borne by parties other than the utilities, such as consumers.  
Consumers, through inflated rates, are subsidizing firms' debt.   
Another argument in favor of stranded cost recovery holds that a regulatory compact 
exists between utilities and government.  First, there is no explicit agreement—it is at 
best implicit.  Second, to suggest that there is a compact is to imply that consideration has 
been extended, that the compact is a bilateral agreement.  It is not apparent that this 
compact, if it exists, is at all bilateral.  That the states are willing to depart from the 
agreement after 100 years implies that consideration has not been rendered and that the 
states have found a more efficient means by which to ensure the provision of electric 
power. 
The courts have weighed in on the issue of stranded cost recovery at various times, 
albeit tangentially.  In Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch from 1989, the court held that 
there was no constitutional guarantee of the recovery of stranded cost by holding that, "A 
state scheme of utility regulation, such as is involved here, does not 'take' property simply 
because it disallows recovery of capital investments that are not 'used and useful in 
service to the public'."33 It has been suggested that true, regulated marginal cost pricing 
would violate the taking clause, but changing the rules by allowing competition is 
consistent with the court's findings in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas 
Co. In that case from 1944, the courts found that states were not bound by any particular 
formula in determining the appropriate rates for interstate natural gas sales.34 With the 
exception of setting rates at or near the true marginal cost of electricity, changing the 
rules seems not to violate the takings clause of the constitution. 
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Smith35 places stranded costs within the restructuring framework.  Utilities had a 
legal obligation to maintain capacity in the face of dynamic demand and cost conditions.  
It is possible that extensive capital investments would be necessary in the face of energy 
uncertainty, especially in the late seventies.  The early investment in nuclear energy could 
be justified as a long term hedge against the uncertainty of fossil fuel prices.  In the 
heavily regulated period, cheap base load capacity would be a long term goal of utilities.  
Nuclear investments represented cheap base capacity, especially given the uncertainty of 
oil prices at the time.  
While California's restructuring allowed the IOUs to recover stranded cost, the 
utilities were not allowed to recover full stranded costs.  Smith makes the argument that a 
quid pro quo existed between regulators and the IOUs.  By demanding that capacity be 
provided in the long run, IOUs were to be guaranteed to be compensated in the long run 
at a guaranteed rate of return.    But the agreement was implicit.  There is no reason why 
regulators would be required to guarantee the recovery of stranded costs.   
But as one commentator36 points out, while stranded costs have been allowed, market 
prices of generating assets have been greater than the estimated value before the bids, the 
value that determines stranded cost.  In almost every case where utilities divested 
generating assets, the assets brought higher than estimated value in the market as 
measured by sale prices.  Fossil fuel generation has not had the problem of stranded 
costs, but this is not necessarily true of nuclear generation.  Trebing observes37 that 
utilities have foisted the importance of stranded cost recovery on regulators for the entire 
restructuring period.  Unfortunately reality has betrayed the IOUs.  Potential new 
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competitive entry has seen these stranded assets priced well above book value, on at least 
one occasion 93.4% above book value.38 A case where the argument in favor of stranded 
cost recovery may be valid involves the prudent investments in nuclear capacity.  These 
assets have little value in the market, making them quintessentially stranded.  Fortunately 
the marginal cost associated with nuclear production continues to make these assets 
viable for base load generation, and evidence exists of planned investments in nuclear 
capacity.39 
Concentration and Market Power: 
 
In the United States, competition has been stalled in electric power industry since 
prior to the passage of PUHCA.  All states have incumbent power producers who have 
acted as the default provider of electric power.  This is a direct consequence of PUHCA.  
Most restructuring plans have explicit provider of last resort provisions to protect 
consumers from the discipline of competition.  The result has been the inadvertent 
creation of market power in the restructured markets.  By creating default providers, 
competition on the retail level is undermined.  By having the default provider provision, 
incumbents are guaranteed market share undermining new entry by firms. 40 
Besides the presence of incumbent power providers, there are other opportunities for 
the exercise of market power in restructured markets.  Before any decision to restructure 
is undertaken, expected persistent market power should not exist in the restructured 
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market.41 One of the major failures of many restructuring plans has been price controls 
enacted to prevent the persistent exercise of market power.  Incumbent power providers, 
combined with price controls to prevent market power that should not exist anyway, 
guarantee that competition in generation will not occur.42 
The importance of price controls in preventing competition is also expressed in 
Crow.43 California fixed retail rates for utility distribution companies.  Crow notes it was 
the fixed retail rates that prevented competition in the California market.  As the 
wholesale spot prices rose in 2001, it was the new entrants who left the market as they 
could not compete with the regulated incumbents.  Pennsylvania also had similar 
problems as California, albeit to a lesser extent.  When wholesale power prices rose in 
Pennsylvania, the new retailers were abandoned in favor of the traditional utilities and 
rate caps.  Crow discusses retail pricing at length.  Like other analysis of electricity 
regulation, the consensus is that California's restructuring plan, with price caps and the 
competitive transition charges, prevented entry by competing firms.  Whatever advantage 
entrants could get was consumed by the competitive transition charge.  As noted in 
Hogan,44 when the legislature decoupled electricity prices from reality by fixing retail 
prices—when wholesale prices rose—the utility distribution companies affected, PG&E 
and SCE, were forced to purchase at the wholesale rate, but sell at the fixed rate, driving 
PG&E into bankruptcy and SCE to the brink.  The state of California had to enter the 
market on their behalf to purchase electricity, as the wholesale generators would not sell 
to the insolvent utilities.  The lesson, as with transmission, is that arbitrary market 
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interference by regulators and legislators, divorced from economic reality, can have 
serious effects on emerging restructured markets.  Wolak45 suggests that the ability to 
offer a menu of options to retail consumers based on a portfolio of spot and future 
contracts is all that is necessary to ensure competition in the market.  The problems in 
California could be avoided by employing such a market design.  The private contract 
approach could have eliminated the need by the state of California to enter the wholesale 
market.   
 
Organization and Governance: 
 
The organization and governance of restructured electricity markets is an important 
aspect of the restructuring.  It is important to know what is the role of the regulator in the 
restructured market. 
Since the passage of PUHCA in 1935 and prior to recent legislative changes, the 
states were the dominant regulator because PUHCA limited the geographic scale of IOUs 
and required incorporation in the primary state they serviced.  The result has been a 
patchwork of regulations across the United States.  At the federal level, the FERC 
regulates the interstate IOUs.  With both federal and state regulation there is overlap, but 
not always cooperation between FERC and the state regulators.  State and federal 
regulators often have divergent goals. 
Wolak46 argues that wholesale electricity markets in the United States will not yield 
consumer benefits relative to the vertically integrated formerly regulated utilities due to 
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the divergent goals of regulators between the retail and wholesale segments of the 
electricity market.  Wolak holds that it is because of these divergent goals that tangible 
benefits to consumers have not accrued. 
Wolak47 notes that neither public utility commissions (PUCs) nor incumbent IOUs 
benefit from the introduction of wholesale competition.  Because FERC is responsible by 
statute of enforcing just and reasonable rates, the PUCs can often pursue their own goals 
that include collaborating with the IOUs, with plausible deniability.  FERC's policies may 
also conflict with what legislators and PUCs believe should be optimal policies to protect 
consumers.   
The role of FERC in the restructured market will be less proactive and should not be 
to bail out consumers for their lack of foresight.  On the national level because of the 
responsibility mandated in the Federal Power Act, Wolak outlines two alternative means 
by which FERC can implement competitive restructuring: eliminate the just and 
reasonable rate standard of the Federal Power Act when a market makes the transition to 
the ISO48 model of wholesale competition, and FERC can issue an order stating that, at a 
pre-specified date, all transactions are per se just and reasonable because they involve 
voluntary trades between willing buyers and sellers.  The date should be two or three 
years in the future. 
Because of lags in market response caused by the time required to build new 
generation, the two or three year condition is necessary.  Wolak does not mention the 
possibility of the placement and installation of small-scale natural gas generation 
technology, notably microtrubines, which could be used to fill the market void.  This is 
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conditional on the assumption that the turbine technology would be cheaper than existing 
peak-load generation.  But if micro-turbine technology is not feasible and the lag is not 
built into regulation, consumers could be required to pay inflated rates for as long as two 
or three years. 
The state regulators have different incentives to guide their decisions.  When 
regulators demand forward contracts and the spot price falls below the forward price, 
there is pressure from legislators and consumer advocates.  But once the regulator allows 
aggressive competitors to eschew forward contracting, in favor of greater risk in the spot 
market, there is no pressure because no forward price exists.  Fortunately Wolak outlines 
a solution.  The competitive market will solve the problem of spot price risk by allowing 
retailers to provide a menu of pricing options from which customers can choose.  With 
customer choice, the consumer makes his own choice of risk to bear.  These incentives 
require two features for effective, competitive restructuring: the regulator must be 
immune from the consequences of allowing wholesalers to mitigate risk in forward 
markets and must focus regulation on protecting consumers by limiting the incentives of 
wholesalers to speculate in electricity markets. 
In transmission there is a more proactive role for the regulator at the national level.  
Trebing49 documents that FERC has continued to have a hand in establishing guidelines 
for transmission organization and governance.  In December of 1999 FERC issued Order 
2000.  It set general guidelines for transmission organization, calling for the "voluntary" 
formation of regional transmission organizations and an end to vertically integrated 
supply systems and greater innovation in pricing to promote regional transactions. 
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Other research has noted the importance of regulators in state markets.  Hogan,50 
citing Joskow and Schmalensee, notes the importance of managing externalities 
associated with a constrained transmission system.  The regulator will need to monitor 
the accumulation of rents by transmission firms.   
There is almost no disagreement on the ability of competitive markets to manage 
capacity in the generation market.  Given the base load, peaking units cover the peak 
demand in times of intense power use.  But economists have underappreciated the 
problem of capacity in the transmission system.  While Hogan refers to transmission 
capacity constraints as externalities, because they are congestion, this characterization 
leads one to treat the transmission problem the same as any other congestion problem.  
As a result, it is indeterminate property rights that are the important issue when dealing 
with transmission.51 The potential for rents exists when congestion is present, but most 
transmission management schemes ignore the important role of congestion rents in the 
market allocation process.  By allowing rents to accrue to the owners of transmission 
capacity, allowing for entry in transmission and long-term contracting in transmission 
services, firms can efficiently supply transmission capacity, even with variable demand 
through the day.   
Regulators have other functions in the states besides monitoring the behavior of 
wholesalers and retailers and transmission rents.  Plant site selection would continue to be 
the responsibility of regulators.  Others have noted that it was site selection problems that 
contributed to the failure of restructuring in California.52 
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Consumer and Environmental Protections: 
 
Consumer and environmental protections have occupied a considerable portion of the 
analysis of electricity restructuring.  The general view is that protections are necessary to 
prevent wholesale generators from exercising market power, but this view is not 
universal. 
Wolak's market framework53 provides the optimal plan for consumer protection: no 
protection.  But this solution is not as draconian as it seems.  His premise allows for 
consumers to select the service they prefer, based on the risk-return tradeoff between 
future and spot market contract portfolios held by electricity retailers.  The competitive 
market will solve the problem of spot price risk by allowing retailers to provide a menu 
of pricing options for the customer to choose from.  With customer choice, the consumer 
makes his own choice of risk to bear. 
Trebing54 does not allow for market determination of consumer preferences.  Much 
like state restructuring legislation, Trebing's vision of consumer protection is derived 
from the lack of real-time demand pricing in the market.  Environmental and consumer 
protections are a significant feature because residential and commercial customers have 
not had the same influence in the market as larger industrial customers.  Residential and 
smaller commercial customers have been in a relatively disadvantaged position because 
of their diffuse interests.  Trebing acknowledges three options for direct consumer 
protection in the states: price cap regulation, procurement aggregation, and the 
certification of deregulated suppliers.  All three options require vigilance from the 
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regulator, unlike Wolak's model.  Trebing accommodates funding or subsidizing high 
cost markets or low income consumers.   
The contrast in the two approaches is striking.  Wolak's model requires only the will 
to credibly force consumers to potentially pay the spot price of electricity.  Trebing, while 
protecting consumers, requires successive layers of regulation.  Parsimony would suggest 
that Wolak's vision to be the most efficient restructuring strategy. 
Wolak does not directly address environmental policy in electricity restructuring, but 
his approach facilely accommodates consumer preferences in electricity consumption.  
Currently many types of technology are inefficient in the fixed price market.  With real-
time demand pricing, these technologies become cost effective in peak hours.  Customers 
will also have the opportunity to invest in the technology of their choice through specialty 
retailers.  One example is solar panels: 
Consequently, a solar panel or other durable but high cost generating technology 
is a hedge against having to pay very high spot prices.  The risk of high spot 
prices during the hottest hours of the summer when the solar panel is most 
effective provides strong incentive for a rational consumer to invest.55 
Many other technologies that are of low capital cost, but costly to operate would also 
fall into this category. 
Trebing observes that most restructuring plans require regulation for the provision of 
"earth friendly" energy alternatives.  The adoption of "Renewable Portfolio Standards" 
(RPSs), a policy that dictates the minimum amount of electricity that must be generated 
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from renewable sources, has been adopted by restructuring states as a means of instituting 
environmental policy in electricity generation.   
Comparing the heavily regulated approach that comes with environmental mandates 
such as RPSs, versus the market approach that comes with real-time demand pricing, the 
latter is more efficient in determining the market allocation of environmental goods. 
 
Consequences of Market Restructuring of Electricity: 
 
Due to the unique characteristics of electricity, most analysis has focused on the form 
of the restructured market.  With planned markets, expect unexpected consequences, 
especially considering persistent, long-term regulation.  Market trading of electricity can 
refer to trading on formalized markets, or it can refer to the development of retail and 
wholesale markets.  As restructuring attempts to resemble more efficient markets, it is 
irrelevant to talk about formal exchanges or mutually beneficial exchanges.  The term 
will be used to describe all exchange in the restructured markets. 
A substantial number of mergers and acquisitions have occurred since changes in 
federal rules were enacted.  They have served to expand substantially the territories of the 
original distributing utility.  Trebing notes that cross-industry mergers between gas and 
electric utilities have become more common in the last decade.  He cites 22 acquisitions 
of gas companies since the start of the latest industry merger wave in the early nineties.  
If mergers and acquisitions in the industry continue, the question of whether the 
consolidation will lead to further competition, or oligopoly and sophisticated market 
structure and pricing strategies, will have to be addressed.  Trebing notes that many 
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studies have found pricing well above marginal energy costs in the states that have 
enacted restructuring. 
There are several studies that have analyzed vertical mergers and acquisitions in the 
industry.  Brennan56 observes that vertical mergers in the industry limit the provision of 
complements, rather than substitutes, and their characterization as "vertical mergers" is 
misleading.  Market power that is horizontal in the input market is germane to the 
analysis.  Convergence mergers are irrelevant if the generator is gas fired—the gas 
producer already has market power.  Efficiency in vertical mergers occurs when "double 
marginalization" is prevented.  This is when suppliers of the input and producers of the 
final good both exercise market power to limit production.  By engaging in a vertical 
merger, the combined firm can more efficiently exercise market power, raising profits for 
the firm and lowering prices for consumers. 
Hunger57 analyzes mergers and acquisitions from the perspective of "raising rival's 
cost."  If the a merger occurs, the upstream gas producer can exercise his market power to 
both capture rents and—by raising rival's cost in the downstream market—increase 
profits for both the gas-fired subsidiary and non gas-fired producers by increasing rival 
gas-fired firm's cost.   
Most analysis of restructuring looks at the importance of energy trading to the 
stability of the market.  The conflict focuses on the effects of energy trading for 
consumers.  Trebing58 claims that energy trading is bad for consumers. He also claims 
that energy trading leads to price risk for consumers.  Unfortunately he leaves these 
claims unsubstantiated in his analysis.   
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Other analysts believe energy trading is necessary for the basic stability of the market.  
Crow59 notes the importance of dynamic electricity markets.  In that electricity markets 
are dynamic, it is important that market participants be able to mitigate risk through long-
term contracting.  The gaming that occurred in California can be directly attributable to 
the failure to design other than spot markets for electricity. 
Wolak60 echoes the belief in the dynamics of markets and incentives.  It is necessary 
for real-time demand pricing to be implemented in order for a stable market to develop.  
Markets are bilateral.  While regulators in most states have been willing to relinquish 
control over the wholesale generation side of the market, they have been reluctant to 
extend the freedom to the retail consumption side.  Wolak reinforces that regulators not 
relinquishing control of the retail side of the market is sufficient to create the conditions 
necessary for gaming by wholesale producers in the market.  Regulators must relinquish 
real-time control of the market to create the conditions for efficient competition.   
Wolak has three criteria that must be met before any real benefits will be generated in 
restructured markets: 
1. Real-time metering must be implemented so that real-time demand pricing 
can occur concomitant with pricing in the wholesale market 
2. Retail competition must be implemented in a way that does not favor 
incumbent utilities 
3. There must be continued monitoring of the retail market by regulators in 
such a way that the interests of consumers are enhanced, rather than 
hindered, by competition 
 
59 Crow 2002 
60 Wolak 2001 
34 
By creating a market structure that follows these general guidelines, an efficient and 
sustainable market structure can be created. 
Due to the physical characteristics of electricity, there is an incentive conflict in the 
creation of electricity markets.  Consumers only have the incentive to make forward 
market purchases of electricity that are necessary to mitigate market risk only when a 
retail market infrastructure exists.  But the retail market infrastructure that exists does not 
penalize the purchase of energy on the spot market due to price and bid caps.  Wolak's 
basic premise is that the only way market efficiency can come about in electricity 
markets is if consumers have an incentive to change their behavior.  But as long as 
regulators do not require consumers to bear the costs of their decisions, consumers will 
never change their behavior.   
Unlike most analysis of market policies, Wolak does not believe anything other than 
real-time demand pricing will deliver benefits to consumers.  The belief is based on the 
understanding that load profiling already provides nearly efficient prices if prices are 
uniform for a month.  Gains from competition derive from the ability of consumers to 
respond to real-time market prices.   
On the production side, consumers benefit when producers can compete on different 
product dimensions.  When real-time metering is not present, the only dimension for 
competition is in monthly average price to consumers.  Without real-time metering, there 
is asymmetric treatment of incumbent retailers to other retailers.  As shown earlier, 
preferential treatment of incumbents will prevent entry by competitors, dissipating the 
benefits of restructuring. 
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An additional problem with conflicting visions of market restructuring is the 
coordination of generation and transmission.  With uniform monthly pricing based on 
load profiling, fluctuations in energy consumption allow for differing levels of congestion 
in the transmission grid.  This creates several problems on the transmission side of the 
market.  Because of congestion, the ISO must actively manage the distribution of power 
at nodes along the grid.  A failure to manage this congestion can lead to failures in the 
entire system.  With congestion, there is the opportunity for the pricing of transmission 
capacity due to scarcity of inter-marginal capacity.  But with the pricing of capacity, 
congestion rents can accrue.  Most analysts do not believe that rents should accrue to the 
owners of scarce capacity, and this is consistent with the regulator's mentality of 
electricity production. 
There is another way of looking at the problem that is consistent with Wolak's real-
time pricing.  Because consumers change their behavior in response to real-time pricing, 
this will affect the structure of locational rents that could potentially accrue with 
transmission pricing.  As consumers respond to real-time price signals—either as 
industrial and commercial producers change their schedules to minimize their exposure to 
prices, or as individuals making lifestyle decisions to optimize in the face of price 
signals—it may make a substantial portion of transmission management unnecessary.  
Consumers will smooth their load profiles in response to pricing signals.  This smoothing 
has the effect of making the congestion problem, if not irrelevant, significantly muted. 
There is empirical evidence from New England that changes in the structure of 
demand could mitigate transmission constraints.  Hale et al.61 notes that the assumption 
that the transmission grid can effectively transmit power from high cost to low cost 
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regions is untested.  Their model of the U. S. Northeast suggests that current capacity, as 
of 1997, would not allow for price equalization across the regions due to specific 
transmission constraints in key areas.  They observe that, "Policies that allow competition 
only among electric generators without additional changes in the design and regulation of 
the transmission system will not deliver the dramatic price reductions that motivated 
policymakers to introduce competition in generation."62 Hale suggests that prices are 
extremely sensitive to transmission line limits and the addition of small generators in 
areas where transmission congestion exists.  If true, it suggests that changes in peak 
demand could have the same effect as changes in capacity, something that could be 
achieved with real-time pricing.  Hale suggests that changes in regulation and the 
behavior of deregulated generators could enhance or hinder interstate price equalization.  
But even with regulatory uncertainty, changes in the structure of consumer demand to 
real-time pricing could substantially affect nodal pricing and constraints. 
If consumers are induced to change their consumption by responding to real-time 
pricing, the role of the regulator changes from focusing on the management of congestion 
to monitoring the portfolio decisions of retailers.  This is the new role of the regulators: to 
mitigate risky behavior by retailers.  
An additional issue with restructuring is the decision by firms to create qualifying 
facilities.  Dismukes and Kleit63 observe that retail rates across the states vary widely, a 
condition that can lead to different incentives for cogenerators across states.  
Theoretically three states can exist for a cogenerating firm.  The cogenerator can 
purchase all of its electricity from utilities if the retail price is less than the long run 
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marginal cost (LRMC) of the potential cogenerator.  Another scenario is for the LRMC 
of the potential cogenerator to be greater that the LRMC, or "avoided cost," of utilities, 
but less than retail price.  In this case the firm "self-generates."  This scenario is socially 
inefficient because the cost to the cogenerator at this point is less than retail price, but 
greater than the utility's avoided cost.  Finally, if the LRMC of the cogenerator is less 
than the avoided cost of the utilities, then the firm produces its own power and sells the 
rest back to the utility at a price equal to avoided cost. 
If the real-time market leads to overall lower prices and lower peak-load prices, then 
firms are less likely to make the decision to invest in cogeneration, leading to more 
efficient production as industrial firms purchase from utilities at competitive rates.  Firms 
that face a flatter hourly cost curve are more likely to avoid cogenerating when the firm's 
cost is greater than utilities' avoided cost. 
An additional incite from Dismukes is the existence of potentially stranded assets 
among industrial generators within states.  If large savings were to occur, firms whose 
former incentive was to install cogenerating facilities now have stranded assets of the 
same sort as utilities. 
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Conclusion: 
 
Many issues have to be reconciled before constructive restructuring can occur.  
Because consumers do not recognize electricity as a good, a combination of smooth 
transition and tough love may be required to effectively transition markets away from the 
former command and control model of the past, to a more efficient, consumer responsive 
model for the future.  There is a sense among analysts that this is the case.   
Some commentators have determined that, in the rush to reinvent competition in 
electricity markets, there were significant lapses in analysis.  Specifically there is a lack 
of understanding in determining efficient transmission and distribution.64 
There is also the sense that restructuring may not be in the interests of some 
consumers right now.  Crow suggests that retail competition may not be desirable due to 
transactions costs associated with switching suppliers.  But ultimately the lesson derived 
from Crow is that restructuring should be given time to work and to be done right.65 
States will continue to fail at restructuring when they do not coordinate national and 
state policies, continue to follow policies that do not require discipline by consumers, and 
follow policies that strive to promote fairness by giving incumbent utilities advantages 
that stifle competition in newly restructured markets.  Until control is relinquished over 
prices and preferences, there will be failures in restructuring. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES FOR ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING 
 
The economic theory of regulation is important to understanding the relationship 
between government, the electric utility industry, and the industry's customers.  It is 
fundamentally the expansion into the direct regulation of firm's economic activity that 
has led to the current structure of the electric utility industry in the United States.  But in 
studying the effect on the industry of government regulation at the state and national 
level, it is important to understand the general theory of regulation in the context of all 
economic activity. 
Any modern analysis of economic regulation since the late sixties should 
acknowledge the seminal contribution of George Stigler and the Chicago tradition of 
economic analysis.  In a series of papers beginning with Stigler's "The Economic Theory 
of Regulation" in 1971, there occurred several important advances in the analysis of 
regulation.  In chronological order—Stigler, Posner, Peltzman, and Becker contributed 
incrementally to develop an understanding of the demand and supply of regulation and its 
application to electricity markets. 
 
Stigler on Regulation 
 
Stigler66 observes that the heart of regulation lies in the coercive powers of the state: 
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The state—the machinery and power of the state—is a potential resource 
or threat to every industry in the society.  With its power to prohibit or 
compel, to take or give money, the state can and does selectively help or 
hurt vast number of industries.67 
But Stigler does not believe regulators are arbitrary in their edicts.  Stigler's theory of 
regulation relies on the rationality of political systems to provide and extract resources 
from members of society—independent of their endowment or ability. 
The economic theory of regulation relies on the ability of the state to coerce citizens.  
The result is a requirement that citizens must appeal to government for the benefits of 
regulation.  According to Stigler, industries generally seek four policies: 
1. Direct subsidy of money to the industry 
2. Control over the entry of new rivals 
3. The suppression of substitutes or complements 
4. The administration of price controls 
While industries attempt to gain these controls from regulators, there are limitations 
on industry that thwart change.  Smaller firms generally gain more from regulation in 
proportion to their size than larger firms do.  Dealing with legislatures and bureaucracies 
has a cost.  And political processes automatically admit outsiders whose interests differ 
from that of the industry. 
The benefits that accrue to an industry or other special interest will be generally less 
than or equal to the damage caused to the rest of the community.  Additionally Stigler 
notes that there are costs to obtaining legislation above and beyond what the group 
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demanding regulation may incur.  The nature of government decisions requires that the 
decision process be fundamentally different from the market process.  To that end, voters 
employ representatives with wide discretion.  The political process also does not allow 
participation in proportion to knowledge or interest in response to the requirement of 
participation by all actors.  Ultimately, any group seeking regulation must be willing to 
deliver votes and resources to representatives in order to benefit from the political 
process. 
Stigler finds that the regulators will act in ways that benefit their support base, subject 
to the implicit costs of providing regulation.  Stigler's thesis that there is a demand—in 
response to benefits that industry could hope to accrue—as well as a supply of 
regulation—subject to the cost or provision of regulation by representatives or 
regulators—forms the basis of the economic theory of regulation. 
 
Posner on Regulation 
 
According to Posner68 in concurrence with Stigler, prior to 1958 with the founding of 
the Journal of Law and Economics, the professional consensus held that markets operated 
inefficiently and that government regulation is costless.  Stigler refutes both hypotheses.  
Under the assumption of inefficiency and market failure we would expect regulation in 
highly concentrated industries and in industries that generate substantial external costs 
and benefits, neither which is the case. 
The public interest theory of regulation, according to Posner, holds that regulation is 
enacted with a public purpose, but is mismanaged so that the public purpose is never 
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achieved.  This view ignores the evidence that groups lobbying for the regulation often 
desire socially undesirable results.  The second criticism is that there is little evidence 
that mismanagement is occurring.  And the evidence that does exist is consistent with 
theories that hold that regulation is often designed to be suboptimal from an economic 
standpoint.  There is also no persuasive theory to explain why regulatory agencies would 
be less efficient than other organizations.  Agency heads have an incentive to enforce 
diligence and honesty, and his employees may one day want to work outside of the 
regulatory bureau, a prospect difficult if he is shown to be incompetent in the bureau. 
Many of the tasks assigned to regulatory agencies are often intractable.  An important 
example is public utility regulation.  The regulator is required, if he is to regulate 
effectively, to determine independently the costs of the regulated entity—an impossible 
task given the incentives of the regulated.  Another problem with regulation is the cost of 
effective legislative supervision.  As monitoring is costly and the legislature loses interest 
through time, the legislature may eventually neglect to monitor the regulatory agency, 
especially as regulation propagates. 
There are significant problems with this formulation of the public interest theory.  
There is no mechanism for the public interest to be translated into legislation.  Coase 
through Posner suggest that the moral difference between political and private action may 
prevent the legislator from enacting regulation contrary to the public interest.  By this 
view, exploitation is limited by the disapprobation of his constituency.  Another approach 
suggests that, because there are only two dominant parties, political collusion could occur 
as the leaders of the parties impose their own policy preferences as the public interest. 
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Posner points out that there are similarities between cartels and regulatory devices 
regulators use to benefit the regulated.  Cartels have both costs and benefits.  The benefits 
are pertinent because regulation often has the same effect, which is to raise price above 
competitive levels.  Just like cartels, the rise in price at best does not exceed the price that 
would be observed if a perfectly enforced cartel were present.  Cost is also relevant.  As 
Stigler69 notes, assuming that it is costly to be a member of the cartel, it is in the interests 
other individuals who may be in the industry to remain outside of the cartel—the free-
rider problem. 
Posner observes that the pattern of cartelization and regulation often differ.  
Regulation is demanded in industries that are difficult or unfeasible to cartelize.  These 
industries lack good substitutes for regulation if they are to avoid competition.  
According to economic theory, ceteris paribus, firms in industries with relatively high 
price elasticities of demand will demand regulation in the absence of cartelization and 
concentration.  Regulation is negatively related to price elasticity of demand across 
industries.  In addition, favorable regulation requires intercession in the political process; 
cartelization is an entrepreneurial phenomenon.  The ability of an industry to acquire 
regulation is proportional to its costs of participating in the political process.  The 
differences in costs of cartelization and the cost of political participation will determine 
whether firms engage one or the other activities.  While industries with a large number of 
participants will engage in political activities, it is cheaper for smaller industries to 
cartelize. 
Posner states that, while size does limit the political influence of many industries, 
their size is favorable in encouraging legislation.  There is a limit to this theory as it does 
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not give us the number of members that maximize the likelihood of regulation.  Posner 
believed that a relatively highly concentrated industry with many employees is optimal, 
as the cost of cartelization is low and the potential political coalition is large in the form 
of employees.  Through bargaining the larger employee organization can share in the 
distribution of profits.  The notable exception to this thesis is the heavy counter industry 
regulation as seen in the auto industry.  But as with many regulations, it is not apparent 
that all regulation that is contrary on its face is contrary in practice, the cross subsidy of 
complements such as roads being an example.   
The problem with highly concentrated firms demanding regulation is that the cost of 
collusion falls with concentration.  While high levels of employment may contribute to 
the allocation of favorable regulation, the ease of cartelization offsets the benefits of 
employment scale.  
Another paradox of regulated industries, according to Posner, is the bipolar 
organization: regulated industries are both atomistic as in farming, or high concentrated.  
Atomistic industries would suffer from endemic free-riders, while highly concentrated 
industries would have less incentive to demand regulation.  But Posner justifies the 
paradox by explaining that monopolistic industries gain from preventing entry, third 
parties often benefit from regulation that directly benefits a particular industry, and the 
concentration or monopoly that exists may be the result of existing regulation.    
Posner notes several features of regulatory regimes that suggest that the regulatory 
process is "designed to achieve the ends posited by the economic theory of regulation."70 
Legislatures reduce monitoring costs by delegating rule-making to administrative 
agencies.  Given the arguments that specialized agencies are more competent in 
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regulation than the courts and that agencies are more insulated than courts from political 
considerations, Posner suggests that the existence of the agencies in lieu of the courts is 
evidence in support of the interest group theory. 
Posner also notes that third parties often benefit from regulation.  The coalition of the 
regulated and third parties ultimately sustains regulation.  As evidence Posner observes 
that the CAB (Civil Aeronautics Board) has never regulated non-price competition by the 
airlines.  As airlines compete in terms of service, they may purchase more equipment 
than otherwise, suggesting that upstream airline suppliers would also be a benefited 
interest group. 
Posner notes that there are significant problems with the empirical implications of the 
economic theory of regulation.   
 The evidence could support any interest group theory.  The details do not 
allow for delineating different theories.   
 The empirical evidence that has been observed has not been systematic, 
suggesting that much explanation of regulation comes from anecdotes rather 
than a consistent set of  studies.   
 The observed regulation is difficult to reconcile with economic theory.   
 The evidence that currently exists rejects the public interest rationale for most 
regulation.   
 It is difficult to trace the effects of regulation.   
 Why is regulation framed in public interest policy and rhetoric? 
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While Posner has difficulty reconciling some features of the economic theory of 
regulation with other alternatives, Posner represents an important step in the 
understanding of the interaction of the political process and the incentives to regulate. 
 
Peltzman on Regulation 
 
Peltzman71 is the formalization of Stigler and Posner into refutable implications of the 
economic theory of regulation.  Stigler clarified the limitations of the "capture" theory of 
government regulation—the major alternative to the naïve "public interest" theory of 
regulation—by noting both a demand for and cost to supplying regulation.  Posner further 
informally investigated the incentives and implications of Stigler's theory.  But it is 
Peltzman that formalizes the economic theory of regulation. 
Peltzman begins his formal expansion of the theory by noting the essential 
commodity that is transacted for in the political market is wealth transfers, with 
constituents on the demand side and political representatives on the supply side.  
Essentially regulation in Peltzman's model is a bidding process between concentrated 
interests acquiring the privilege to tax the diffuse interests in the political process.  It is 
interest group size relative to the cost of using the political process that determines the 
success of the appeal for regulation.  Peltzman finds that political group size will be 
limited by the growth in lobbying and campaign cost and the presence of "free riders" 
among the group that is seeking transfers. 
Among the important conclusions of Peltzman is that, even when a single interest gets 
all of the benefits of regulation, the benefit will be less under government organization 
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than under pure monopoly.  Additionally, he finds that the regulator's constituency will 
not generally be limited to one economic interest.  And because of the difficulties in 
translating a tax into political opposition, the regulator will tax the many to concentrate 
the benefits on the politically favored few.  These effects will result in three propositions 
about the assignment of benefits of regulation: 
1. Given imperfect information about the gains and losses of regulatory 
decisions, the size of the winning constituency will be restricted. 
2. The winners will still not get the full potential gain from political action. 
3. Even aligning economic interests into winners and losers, some of the losers 
will be admitted into the winning coalition. 
Under the rubric of price-entry regulation, Peltzman's formalization has several 
empirical implications: 
 During depressions producers generally receive protection, while during 
expansions regulation favors consumer protection. 
 "Government intervention and regulation are both normal goods." 
 "Regulatory lag" is generally stronger during demand changes than during 
cost changes. 
 Producer protection will yield to consumer protection as an industry's 
technology progresses and output grows. 
 The most profitable firms should have the lowest prices. 
 Economies of scale and elastic demand tend to favor consumers in the 
competition for regulation. 
 Regulation reduces risk. 
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There are some implications about the structure of regulated prices.  Peltzman finds 
that regulated prices will deviate from those found under pure monopoly, but they will 
also deviate from those under pure competition.  The regulator taxes profits by 
attenuating profitable price discrimination.  Peltzman further finds that "cross 
subsidization" will take place.  Posner72 first observed that "internal subsidization" often 
occurs in regulated industries.  The profits associated with serving one group will be used 
to subsidize sales to a second group.  Electric sales to rural customers are often 
subsidized by sales to urban customers as fixed costs associated with distribution and 
transmission are higher for rural customers.   
An implication of the form of price regulation is the necessity of further regulation to 
prevent entry when cost of service differs among customers in order to prevent "cream 
skimming," or the competition for low cost-of-service customers.  Additionally, 
regulators will encourage entry when differences in elasticity of demand exist among 
customer segments in order to prevent profit maximizing price discrimination.  Both 
phenomena can be explained by the political gains associated with preventing price 
discrimination or abetting cross subsidization.   
Peltzman finds that the political contribution to regulation is to force a more uniform 
treatment of consumers.  This is in addition to creating both winners and losers among 
the winning coalition; and while there are winners, they never gain the full potential 
benefit of regulation. 
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Becker on Regulation 
 
Becker73 contributed to the analysis of regulation by modeling the competition 
between various groups vying for political influence.  Individuals through group 
membership use the political process to influence the structure of taxes, subsidies, and 
other political transfers. 
A political equilibrium in the Becker model suggests that all groups maximize their 
income by optimally spending on political pressure, given the productivity of 
expenditures and the behavior of other groups.  The model also requires that changes in 
influence of a group that affects taxes and subsidies will affect the subsidies and taxes of 
other groups.  The result is a political game that is zero-sum: the net of taxes and 
subsidies has to equal zero.     
There are several countervailing forces in political competition.  Free riding will 
impose costs on producing pressure.  Deadweight costs affect the equilibrium by 
encouraging the efforts of taxed groups and simultaneously discouraging the efforts of 
subsidized groups.  And groups are only politically active as long as additional pressure 
raises their influence. 
Out of the basic model Becker proposes several resulting propositions.  The ability to 
produce efficiently political pressure tends to lower taxes or increase subsidies for the 
affected group.  Perhaps more importantly, it is relative effectiveness at producing 
political pressure that affects transfers rather than absolute effectiveness.  Due to the 
relative—rather than absolute—effect of political pressure, Becker suggests that too 
much has been made of the importance of the free rider problem.   
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The treatment of deadweight losses is important to the equilibrium in the Becker 
model.  There is a bias towards efficiency enhancement built in to the Becker model.  
Increases in deadweight costs reduce equilibrium subsidies.  Taxes and subsidies that 
generate or exacerbate deadweight losses will be less persistent than efficiency-enhancing 
taxes and subsidies.  This creates a tendency to maintain the status quo.  Becker notes that 
this is not the same a laissez-faire policy because there is still a tendency for government 
to protect the affected sector from unforeseen shocks. 
Becker notes that, at least for the political sector, "sunk costs are not sunk."  Due to 
the short-run inelasticity of supply and firm-specific human capital, political groups will 
be effective in promoting protection from industry shocks.  The longer the "shock," the 
more ineffective protections will be for groups harmed by the shocks as the deadweight 
costs associated with protections increase. 
An additional insight from the Becker model concerns the success of relatively small 
groups to relatively larger groups.  When small groups lobby for subsidies or protections, 
they are generally more successful than taxed groups who are relatively larger.  This is 
due to the diffusion of costs associated with taxing a large group, relative to the smaller 
subsidized group.  Additionally, the smaller group will be smaller than the efficient size 
to most lobby effectively due to the diffusion of benefits of the subsidy relative to the 
effectiveness of additional lobbying. 
Becker and Posner74 converge under the auspices of internal subsidization.  Becker 
proposes that public enterprises may be more efficient than private enterprises due to the 
effects of internal subsidization.  Taking subsidies into account, the output of public 
versus private enterprises are comparable.  And if subsidization is an objective of public 
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enterprises, then the public enterprise may be more efficient than the private enterprise, 
all else equal.  This assumes that subsidies provided by public entities are more efficient 
than through private enterprises.  Cross-subsidization is an important characteristic of 
many industries that have substantial public components—including railroads, electricity, 
and other publicly provided services. 
Becker also notes that cooperation among pressure groups can have important, 
efficiency-enhancing effects.  Because the relative effect of political pressure is 
important, the optimal strategy for pressure groups involves cooperation.  The existence 
of laws that limit political competition can limit wasteful expenditures by pressure 
groups.  Given the criticism of the McCain-Feingold Act of 2002, the Becker model is 
one instance proponents can note a positive theoretical effect from the legislation. 
Equilibrium in the Becker model relies on an assumption that each group acts 
independently of others.  Consequently it is not appealing if a limited number of pressure 
groups are assumed.  Assuming the existence of a large number of pressure groups, then 
the equilibrium observed where the marginal benefits of lower taxes or higher subsidies 
is equal to the marginal cost of additional political pressure.  Even assuming that pressure 
groups respond to additional efforts by counter-groups, then the presence of free-riding 
will have offsetting effects. 
An intriguing aspect of Becker's model is the irrelevance of voter preferences.  
Becker assumes that information costs counter any preference that independent voters 
may have.  There is a cost associated with a voter becoming informed about a particular 
issue otherwise irrelevant to them, save for taxation effects.  As the number of voters 
increases, the marginal voter has less incentive to acquire additional information.  The 
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irrelevance of voter preferences is a major divergence from previous modeling of 
political pressure groups that emphasized coalition formation dependent on fixed 
preferences of voters.  The irrelevance of voter preferences also explains why new 
information contrary to the interests of powerful pressure groups often has little effect on 
policy.  Pressure groups actively attempt to offset contrary information with selective 
information of their own. 
 
Electricity and the Economic Theory of Regulation 
 
The economic theory of regulation has significant application to the regulation of 
electric utilities.  In order for firms to gain from the political process, it is necessary for 
firms to contribute, directly, to the political process.  Fortunately federal election 
reporting requirements allow the public to observe how the industry contributes to the 
political system.  Figure 2.1 shows the total contributions made by electric utilities in the 
2006 election cycle:75 
75 Center For Responsive Politics 
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Total contributions were $15.5 million in 2006.  The electric utility industry ranked 
20th out of 80 industries that contributed to political campaigns in the 2006 election cycle.   
Figure 2.1
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Total Industry Contributions to Political Campaigns 
 
Figure 2.2 above represents total contributions by the electric utility from 1990 to 
200676. While contributions have been declining since 2002, especially given the drop 
due to the ban on soft money contributions, there have been significant contributions and 
increases since 1990 in money from PACs (political action committees) as restructuring 
has occurred in the electric utility industry.  This is evidence that the industry actively 
lobbies for regulation or restructuring.  The run up and drop from 2004 to 2006 can be 
attributed to the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the legislation that effectively 
repealed PUHCA77; with passage, continual contribution became unnecessary.  Political 
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contributions by the utility industry are widespread and are evidence of the industries 
interest in regulatory legislation on the national level. 
Contributions By Year 
Figure 2.3 
 
Figure 2.3 shows by year the composition of contributions78. Beginning in 1992, the 
start of state restructuring, the electric utility industry began rising in rank compared to 
80 other industries across the United States.  The trend continued until the peak in 2002, 
the beginning of the end of the wave of industry restructuring.  After 2002 the industry 
fell to 25th in industry contributions, but began rising to 21st in 2006.  This coincides with 
the repeal of much of PUHCA in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.79 
As there is evidence of industry interest in the political process, what form should we 
expect regulation to take in the Stigler-Posner-Peltzman-Becker regulatory framework?  
Peltzman gives an indication of the form regulation takes once the decision to regulate is 
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1994.  A flip in party contributions should occur with the next report in 2008. 
56 
made.  While regulation at the state level was dominant prior to the passage of PUHCA80,
it is probably not a coincidence that it passed a few years subsequent to the start of the 
Depression as incomes were rising.  Peltzman suggests that economic expansion is 
conducive to consumer protection, which PUHCA is almost universally understood to 
be.81 And regulation is considered to be a normal good; it expands with income. 
Another implication on legislation is the dynamic effects between producer and 
consumer protection.  Peltzman concludes that producer protection yields to consumer 
protection as technology progresses and output grows.  Early in the history of electricity 
regulation there was a significant move towards preventing entry into electricity 
production, especially at the state level.  Larger cities often had several suppliers of 
electricity, making regulation by the formation of franchise monopolies convenient for 
states and municipalities.82 Jarrell83 suggests that municipal franchises were often very 
competitive and the move from municipal to state regulation was ultimately beneficial for 
utilities.  But as output grew and the effective scale of utilities grew, regulation switched 
to consumer protection, especially with the enactment of PUHCA in 1935.  Continuing 
through the 80s and 90s, production technology developed and in response, beginning in 
1992, the industry was restructured in many states.  The changing structure of regulation 
generally benefited consumers, allowing for adaptations by the industry that ostensibly 
lowered the average cost to consumers. 
Winston84 cites numerous studies that reinforce the view that deregulation has 
benefited consumers, but much of the benefit was unintended in form.  Economists 
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reliably predict the beneficial price effects.  But economists have a poor track record in 
predicting the form of the restructured industry—failing to foresee the formation of hubs 
in the airline industry, among others.  This will occur in the electric power industry, 
especially since the repeal of much of PUHCA in 2005.  Provisions in PUHCA limited 
the geographic scope of IOUs.  IOUs were limited in their ability to diversify into other 
industries, and technology and regulation limited the ability of utilities to take advantage 
of real-time pricing until relatively recently.  These are potential non-price changes that 
could occur with a change in regulation. 
Peltzman observed that regulation reduces risk.  This would suggest that price 
volatility would decline with regulation, which may be true.  But wages in the electric 
industry would also reflect the reduced risk to workers.  Hendricks85 has shown that in 
regulated industries, with the exception of trucking, that regulation tends to have a 
negative effect on wages, despite collective bargaining.  If wages are lower in industries 
that are regulated, then the wage differential between the regulated and unregulated 
occupational categories could reflect the security in the implicit contract86 between 
workers and employers in the regulated industry relative to the unregulated industry 
across similar occupational groups. 
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The Regulatory Implications for Restructuring in the Stigler-Posner-Peltzman-Becker 
Framework 
 
Peltzman suggests the form that regulation and subsequent restructuring will take.  
According to Stigler, Posner, Peltzman, and Becker—regulation should have several 
characteristics.  The size of the winning coalition will be restricted due to the presence of 
uncertainty and free riders.  The winners will not receive the full potential gains from 
regulation.  And finally, the winners will have to admit a sub coalition of the losers.  All 
three factors have been observed in the form of regulation that has developed in the 
electric power industry. 
Under every form of regulation, the industry has included only a subset of the 
potential winners from among the utilities.  Producers of electricity are a diverse group.  
Originally the utilities were private firms, the IOUs, but they also include the federal 
government in the form of TVA87 and the Bonneville Power Administration, various state 
agencies such as Santee-Cooper in South Carolina, and numerous municipal companies 
and rural cooperatives that supply power to specific cities and counties.  There has 
historically been competition between the private and public utilities.  They have 
independently lobbied for and against exclusive territories and wheeling arrangements, 
but they share incentives.  They both have a vested interest in limiting the scale and scope 
of competition, keeping each other out, while reaping the benefits of regulation.  As with 
the initial regulation of the industry, there will continue to be attempts to limit the 
winners among the coalition of producers, with competing interests among the producers. 
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The demanders represent a large interest as well.  Among pricing groups, three broad 
categories are present: the industrial, commercial, and residential customers.  There is 
substantial price discrimination among the customer classes possibly representing 
variations in the cost of service among the groups.  There are substantial fixed costs in 
distribution to residential and some commercial customers, relative to the cost of service 
to industrial customers.  But within the three classes there are substantial subsets that are 
potentially their own coalition. 
Among the residential customer base are several sub coalitions that potentially ally 
with producers.  The rural customers are one potential group.  Posner88 notes that 
regulators enforce internal subsidization by requiring IOUs to provide electricity to rural 
customers in exchange for regulatory protection.  With the subsidy, rural residents benefit 
from the industries' regulation at the expense of more urban residents.  Utilities are often 
asked to subsidize schools and fire departments in exchange for exclusive franchises.  
Environmental interests benefit as well.  Most restructuring plans include 
accommodations for "green power," power from renewable or other renewable sources.  
There are also benefits for the poor and other classes of consumers.  These include 
subsidies in the winter and other specialized programs. 
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The Chicago theory of regulation notes that while there are winners and losers to 
regulation, the winners never get the maximum benefit of regulation.  Each commentary 
on regulation noted different ways in which winners pay for the regulation they receive.  
Peltzman89 provides the most refutable implication for regulation in that there is never 
optimal price discrimination.  The losers lose, but they never lose everything.  In 
shielding or manipulating markets, the winners are never able to fully exploit their gains.   
Restructuring is an apt term to describe the changes in state electricity regulation.  
Figure 2.4 is a graph of the ratio of residential to industrial weighted average revenue 
from 1990 to 2004: the higher the ratio, the greater the degree of price discrimination 
between industrial and residential customers.  While the ratio in the restructured states is 
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comparable to the non restructuring states prior to 1993, they begin to diverge soon after.  
The beginning of state restructuring occurred around 1996, the point at which the mean 
difference in ratios between restructuring and non-restructuring states is greatest.  After 
1996, there is convergence between non-restructuring and restructuring state ratios until 
2000, when the restructuring states finally surpass the non-restructuring states. 
The volatile changes in ratios between restructuring and non-restructuring states are 
consistent with Peltzman's model of regulation if it is assumed that restructuring was not 
deregulation.  From 1992 until 1996 represents a period of regulatory lag as federal 
regulation of the industry began to change.  In 1996 the first states to enact restructuring 
began passing legislation.  After 2000, many states began to change the nature of 
restructuring in response to California and Pennsylvania's experience with restructuring.  
The 1992 through 1996 period represents a time in which federal efforts were leading 
states efforts, possibly achieving de facto deregulation as the industry experienced a wave 
of mergers and acquisitions.  The future restructuring states experience increasing 
residential to industrial ratios, consistent with regulatory lag.  1996 through 2000 
represents a period in which state restructuring was adapting to changes in federal 
regulation and changes in industry structure—a period of subtle re-regulation.  Again, the 
restructuring states are responding to changes in federal regulation if price discrimination 
is a bellwether of regulation.  Finally the period after 2000 is consistent with state efforts 
to back-pedal in response to negative outcomes in California and Pennsylvania—a 
regulatory hangover, the response being re-regulation.  While the story is stylized, it is 
consistent with other experiences in restructuring and deregulation.90 
90 Winston 1992 
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Another measure of the effect of regulation is the relative difference in average 
revenue and cost per BTU.  Figure 2.5 is the percentage difference in average revenue 
and cost per BTU, a measure of marginal cost: 
Percentage Difference in Average Revenue and Cost per BTU: All Customer Classes
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Figure 2.5 
 
The percentage difference between average revenue and cost are similar across customer 
classes.  Beginning in 1996, the restructuring states allowed a much smaller premium 
than the non-restructuring states.  Especially after 1999, the restructuring states allowed 
much less cost pass-through than the non-restructuring states.   
There were many differences between restructuring on non-restructuring states when 
looking at the aggregated state-level data.  Noting the inflation adjusted trends could be 
useful in determining trends in prices across the periods, a consequence of restructuring.  
Below is average revenue across all three sectors, adjusted for inflation, from 1996 to 
2003: 
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Inflation Adjusted Average Revenue: Commercial
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Inflation Adjusted Average Revenue: Industrial
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There is a clear trend in declining average prices, relative to consumer goods, throughout 
the period.  This is evidence that politicians were not responding to increases in price 
relative to other consumer goods, but to differences observed between their home states 
and other states.   
Looking at average revenue, there are substantial differences between restructuring 
and non-restructuring states in every sector.  Through the early 90s, commercial 
customers in the restructuring states often paid more than residential customers in non-
restructuring states.  There was also a substantial difference in average revenue to 
residential customers in the early restructuring period compared to the commercial and 
industrial sectors.  Expect differences between sectors and the restructuring and non-
restructuring states, but the convergence of rates by sector indicates that restructuring 
affected residential rates.  Regulators in the restructuring states allowed a substantial 
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amount of cost to pass through to residential customers in restructuring states, relative to 
the commercial and industrial customers. 
More indicative of the impact of the difference in rates is revenue per customer.  
Revenue per customer is a measure of what households and firms pay per year.  It takes 
into account both quantity demanded and price paid by the customer.   
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Figure 2.9 
 
Looking at restructuring and non-restructuring states, there is no clear trend in 
converging or diverging revenue per customer.  Neither is there a clear trend in the 
individual sector data, suggesting that restructuring may have had no effect on overall 
consumer welfare. 
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Table 2.1 
Relative Difference in Revenue per Customer in Restructuring and Non-Restructuring States 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Avg 
Residential -6.5% -4.7% -8.1% -8.2% -9.9% -9.3% -12.6% -10.7% -8.5% 
Commercial 31.4% 24.5% 22.9% 20.8% 20.5% 18.9% 17.8% 16.3% 22.4% 
Industrial -2.7% -20.8% -17.7% -25.1% -16.8% -24.6% -31.0% -21.4% -19.8% 
All 2.7% 4.0% 1.3% -0.3% 0.0% 2.3% -1.6% -0.8% 1.2% 
Source: EIA          
Looking at the individual sector data in Table 2.1, the residential sector had a relatively 
modest, but improving benefit from 1996 through 2003.  The commercial sector did not 
benefit at all in the relative sense, although 2001 through 2003 shows some relative 
improvement.  The biggest relative benefit went to the industrial sector, who from 1996 
to 1997 had a 20% increase in relative benefit that was maintained through 2003.  While 
there were clear benefits to residential and industrial customers, the benefit to 
commercial customers offsets both to a degree, reflecting no clear trend in overall 
consumer expenditures. 
Table 2.2 
Relative Difference in Total Revenue Between Restructuring and Non-Restructuring States 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Avg 
Residential 56.8% 58.7% 52.2% 50.9% 46.3% 48.7% 43.1% 43.9% 50.9% 
Commercial 108.2% 94.2% 90.2% 84.7% 82.9% 86.3% 82.7% 80.4% 89.9% 
Industrial 40.2% 49.1% 45.6% 38.6% 42.2% 51.1% 44.8% 48.1% 44.5% 
All 70.2% 71.2% 65.9% 61.9% 60.5% 66.2% 59.9% 59.2% 65.1% 
Source: EIA          
Table 2.2 is the relative difference in revenue between restructuring and non-
restructuring states.  There is a decline in the relative difference in total revenue between 
1996 and 2003 in the residential sector, suggesting convergence between the restructuring 
and non-restructuring states over the restructuring period.  The commercial sector shows 
an even stronger decline in relative revenues through the restructuring period.  There 
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appears to be no clear trend in convergence in the industrial sector, although removing 
2001 suggests a slight decrease.  Comparing all three, with the exception of 2001, there 
appears to be convergence between the restructuring and non-restructuring states in terms 
of total revenues generated by sales.  Convergence suggests that restructuring had some 
modest effect, possibly due to a competitive response to lower prices in the non-
restructuring states.  
Table 2.3 represents the price-cost margin by sector.  The price-cost margin is a 
measure of allowed cost pass-through by regulators or competition, as cost in this case 
refers the marginal costs associated with average fuel prices in a state in a given year.  
The difference in average revenue and fuel costs by sector can be explained by differing 
costs of service and price discrimination, although variation between restructuring and 
non-restructuring states is most likely due to regulatory treatment rather than other 
exogenous causes.  Consistent with the differing cost of service explanation and price 
discrimination, the margin is greatest for residential consumers in the restructuring and 
non-restructuring states.  The commercial margin is higher than industrial ratio, 
reinforcing cost of service and price discrimination as explanations of differences 
regardless of regulatory stance. 
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Table 2.3 
Price-Cost Margin 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Avg 
Residential 62.3% 64.6% 72.1% 71.7% 59.7% 58.3% 64.3% 64.7% No
Restructuring Commercial 57.6% 59.6% 67.8% 67.1% 53.1% 51.4% 58.5% 59.3% 
Industrial 38.3% 40.0% 52.2% 51.5% 31.8% 30.8% 40.3% 40.7% 
All  54.2% 56.5% 65.5% 65.0% 50.4% 49.3% 56.6% 56.8% 
Restructured Residential 55.6% 49.6% 58.1% 59.6% 39.1% 34.7% 52.2% 49.8% 
Commercial 48.4% 41.0% 50.7% 52.4% 28.6% 25.6% 45.5% 41.7% 
Industrial 23.9% 12.1% 27.1% 29.5% -0.4% 1.0% 26.7% 17.1% 
All  45.9% 38.1% 48.5% 50.3% 26.4% 24.0% 44.3% 39.6% 
Source: EIA          
The greatest differences occurred for industrial consumers in 2000 and 2001, a period 
when many restructuring provisions went into effect.  But there was also substantial 
change in the residential and commercial sectors, consistent with the implementation of 
provisions in the restructuring states. 
Table 2.4 
Price-Cost Margin Without California 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Avg 
Residential 62.3% 64.6% 72.1% 71.7% 59.7% 58.3% 64.3% 64.7% No 
Restructuring Commercial 57.6% 59.6% 67.8% 67.1% 53.1% 51.4% 58.5% 59.3% 
Industrial 38.3% 40.0% 52.2% 51.5% 31.8% 30.8% 40.3% 40.7% 
All  54.2% 56.5% 65.5% 65.0% 50.4% 49.3% 56.6% 56.8% 
Restructured Residential 57.8% 51.7% 60.1% 61.7% 44.2% 42.1% 56.6% 53.5% 
Commercial 50.9% 43.5% 52.8% 54.7% 34.1% 33.5% 50.0% 45.6% 
Industrial 27.4% 15.6% 30.2% 32.9% 7.5% 11.3% 32.2% 22.5% 
All  48.5% 40.7% 50.8% 52.9% 32.3% 32.3% 49.0% 43.8% 
Source: EIA          
Table 2.4 is the price-cost margin without the California data.  California was unusual 
due to the problems specific to the California restructuring plan, specifically binding 
price caps on retail rates.  Some of the other restructuring states also had price caps, but 
they were never binding.  Removing California from the data shows that there was a 
precipitous decline in price-cost margin even without the effect from California, 
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suggesting that the convergence of price and cost was not isolated to the effects of 
California. 
 
Table 2.5 
Relative Difference in Restructured to Non-Restructured Price-Cost Margin 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Avg 
Residential -10.7% -23.3% -19.3% -16.8% -34.4% -40.5% -18.9% -23.4% 
Commercial -15.9% -31.2% -25.2% -22.0% -46.2% -50.3% -22.2% -30.5% 
Industrial -37.5% -69.8% -48.1% -42.8% -101.3% -96.8% -33.7% -61.4% 
All  -15.3% -32.6% -26.0% -22.6% -47.5% -51.2% -21.7% -31.0% 
Source: EIA         
Comparing the restructuring and non-restructuring groups in Table 2.5, the non-
restructuring states have a consistently greater price-cost margin.  It is consistent across 
years and sectors compared to the restructuring group.  This is evidence that the 
restructuring had an overall effect of lowering the degree of price discrimination and cost 
pass-through allowed by regulators. 
Table 2.6 
Relative Difference in Restructured to Non-Restructured Price-Cost Margin Without California 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Avg 
Residential -7.2% -19.9% -16.6% -13.9% -26.0% -27.8% -12.1% -17.6% 
Commercial -11.6% -27.0% -22.0% -18.5% -35.8% -34.8% -14.6% -23.5% 
Industrial -28.4% -61.0% -42.1% -36.1% -76.5% -63.3% -20.0% -46.7% 
All  -10.6% -28.0% -22.5% -18.6% -35.8% -34.4% -13.4% -23.3% 
Source: EIA         
Removing California from the data, as in Table 2.6, there is still and strong and consistent 
effect. 
The uncertainty of industry structure complicates restructuring, as restructuring is an 
uncertain path.  Wolak91 observes that real-time pricing could provide substantial benefits 
for all classes of consumers.  There are economies of scope that are available to IOUs 
 
91 Wolak  2001 
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that were unavailable prior to 2005 because of PUHCA.  These are only two examples of 
changes in the industry that restructuring could possibly affect.  The broader implication 
with respect to deregulation versus restructuring, or re-regulation, is that no one can 
predict what the potential benefits are, outside of price, as a result of deregulation as 
opposed to restructuring.  If the industry successfully lobbies for barriers to entry in 
return for price regulation, then the potential gains through innovation resulting from 
changes in industry form and structure may never materialize.  The principal result of 
effective political jockeying by the industry will be to slow change and innovation of any 
form.  
 
Conclusion 
 
A general regulatory theme is observable.  From the introduction of state commission 
regulation, as opposed to municipal franchise agreements,92 there have been competing 
interests.  The producers have lobbied for exclusive territories and the price regulation 
that comes with it.  Consumers have always demanded protection from the unfettered 
ravages of unprincipled monopoly utilities.  And various interests—from 
environmentalists, individual customer sub-classes, and other governmental agencies—
have lobbied for special accommodation.  What will result will be a function of  
production technology, costs in each state, and the ability of special interests in the 
individual states to extract beneficial regulation.   
As production costs have declined with technology, and the efficient scale of 
production has changed, it is advantageous to all market participants for the form of 
 
92 Jarrell 1978 
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regulation to change.  Consumers will have some concessions on pricing, but they will 
never get true competitive prices reflecting a conventionally competitive rate of return, in 
contrast to the return allowed under rate of return regulation.  Utilities will be forced to 
concede on pricing in response to technological changes, but they will continue to price 
discriminate.  And the price discrimination that occurs will be suboptimal from the 
perspective of the utilities.  While the industry will admit new producers, the industry 
will demand concessions that will deter entry by competitors.  The industrial customer 
sector will benefit in proportion to its demand elasticity for electricity and the influence it 
can muster in the legislature.  The ability of the industrial customer, relative to 
commercial and residential customer, to influence regulation will determine whether the 
industrial customer becomes a beneficiary of industry regulation.  The same will be true 
for environmental and advocates for the poor.  But ultimately the general class of 
commercial and residential customers will lose in the competition for regulation.  
Stigler, Posner, Peltzman, and Becker's contributions to the economic theory of 
regulation have enlightened the understanding of the regulation of the electric power 
industry.  Their insights into the structure and form of regulation have aided in 
understanding the form restructuring would take in the last 10 years.  By recognizing that 
it is the confluence of various interests groups, rather than naïve belief in the public 
interest or the cynical machinations of industry lobbyists looking to "capture" the 
regulator, the economic theory of regulation has broadened and enlightened the 
economist's understanding of restructuring in the electric utility industry. 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
MODELING THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY EFFECTS OF STATE 
LEVEL ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING 
 
Introduction 
The electric industry in the United States has been undergoing significant 
structural change throughout the nineties because of a hundred years of relatively high 
cost state and federal regulation.  There is the question of whether restructuring in the 
form of the deregulation of wholesale generation markets has resulted in a decline in cost 
per kilowatt-hour (kWh) to customers.  The customer classes include industrial, 
commercial, and residential customers. 
An issue that is inextricably related to the cost to firms is the role of regulators or 
the utility commissions within states in creating and determining the conditions that led 
to restructuring.  There is irrefutable evidence that throughout the regulatory period the 
state regulators have acted on the behalf of consumers in limiting prices firms charged 
consumers; regulation prevented the exercise of monopoly pricing power.  But at the 
same time, evidence exists that regulators granted significant rents to utilities in exchange 
for stable output and prices.  With the enactment of restructuring legislation, legislatures 
have focused attention away from maintaining stability and elected to allow for the 
competitive production of power with coordination to both promote competition and limit 
disruptions. 
The political process within the regulatory agency is also an important 
consideration in determining whether states restructure or not.  A political as well as 
economic decision occurs when the level of cost allowed to pass-through to customers, or 
the rate of return to the firm, is determined by regulators in the states.  While regulators 
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operate as an agent of the legislature in the determination of industry regulation, they 
often have incentives that differ from those of the legislature. 
The model simultaneously determines whether restructuring occurs as a function 
of the legislature's structure and expected savings from restructuring.  At the same time, 
fuel costs and the structure of the regulatory regime determine the price of electricity in 
the state, with average revenue used as a proxy. 
 
Who are the Regulators? 
 
In modeling regulation, it is important to understand who is doing the 
regulating.93 The state regulatory agencies represent a diverse group with a variety of 
jurisdictions and responsibilities.  Most states combine responsibility for transportation 
along with utilities and other regulated services.  The federal government as well 
separates communications from the regulation of electricity and gas.  Even at the federal 
level communications are the responsibility of the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) while electric utilities and interstate natural gas are the responsibility of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).  Most states limit the regulatory 
separation to distinctions between transportation and other monopolistic services.  Even 
at the federal level, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) prior to its dissolution 
regulated transportation.  As an example of the diverse industries that the regulator is 
 
93 The following is based on the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) 
report: Profiles of Regulatory Agencies of the United States and Canada: Yearbook 1995-1996. The last 
available year for the yearbook was 1996.  NARUC was founded in 1889 as a quasi-governmental 
nonprofit corporation.  Its stated goal is "to serve the consumer interest by seeking to improve the quality 
and effectiveness of public regulation in America." 
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asked to regulate, the Virginia State Corporation Commission (Virginia SCC) is 
responsible for: 
 
 Setting IOU rates 
 Licensing insurance companies and agents 
 Examining Insurance Companies 
 Investigating the sale of unregistered securities 
 Registering investment advisors 
 Examining state chartered banks 
 Licensing money order sellers 
 Assessing for local taxation the property of IOUs94 
While the regulator's responsibility is expansive in Virginia, this is in no way unique to 
Virginia.  Many other states have endowed their state regulatory commissions with broad 
oversight of many diverse industries.  Besides IOUs and other utilities, these industries 
include steam heating companies, docks and wharves, landfills, warehouses, weights and 
measures, and water carriers. 
 The members of these commissions are also a diverse group.  Most states do not 
require specific professional backgrounds for commission members, although many do 
require that a member be a qualified attorney.  Even though most states do not require 
that attorneys sit as commissioners, most have commissioners sitting.  The majority of 
the rest include engineers, businessmen, professional civil servants, accountants, and the 
 
94 NARUC 1996, p.250 
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occasional economist.  There are a few interesting occupations sitting.  A priest sits on 
the Virgin Island PSC and a journalist on the Minnesota PUC. 
Many of the states do not have a specific age requirement for commission 
members, although many require that commission members be qualified electors of the 
state.  What age requirements that do exist generally run from 18 to 30.  Roughly a third 
must take an oath of office, and most are appointed (44 states).  The 12 states that elect 
commissioners include Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nebraska, the New Mexico State Corporation Commission, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, and the Texas Railroad Commission.  Two Texas commissions and a New 
Mexico commission are appointed.  An interesting study would be to understand what 
makes for an elected versus and appointed commission.  Why the Texas RC is distinct 
from the Texas PUC or the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission is not 
clear. 
Sitting on a commission can lead to various conflicts of interest.  Most states have 
addressed this problem by placing constraints on commissioners' conduct, although 21 of 
the commissions have not.  Of interest is that 8 of the 12 states that have commissions 
that are elected do not place restraints upon commissioners to not work for the regulated 
industries after leaving the commission.  Of the states that do place constraints on 
commissioners, most of the constraints are statutory although many are commission 
rules.  The legislatures are seemingly aware of the potential for regulatory corruption and 
have addressed it.  Examples of restrictions include the Michigan PSC:  
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For six months after leaving the Commission, a commissioner shall not be 
retained or employed by any public utility or public service subject to the 
jurisdiction and control of the commission.95 
or New Hampshire PUC: 
 
No Commissioner shall accept any employment with any utility under the 
control of the Commission until two years after separation form the 
Commission.96 
Most states have similar restrictions on post employment.  The states that enacted 
restructuring disproportionately had post commission employment restrictions.  While 
this would seem to refute a hypothesis that commissions act in the interest of electric 
producers, the states that do not have post commission employment restrictions are 
disproportionately in the South and rural Midwest, states like Alabama and the Dakotas, 
where electricity rates have historically been low and therefore would have little 
incentive to restructure. 
 The commissions are unremarkably similar in their ethical restrictions.  All have 
statutory codes of ethics, propriety requirements, prohibitions on financial interests in the 
regulated entities, prohibitions on the acceptance of gifts, and they are allowed to eat at 
public meetings.  But, as explained before, post-agency representative employment and 
past employment by advocates are neither excluded nor prohibited universally. 
 
95 NARUC. p.377 
96 NARUC. p.378 
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 Most commissioners are employed full time.  Arkansas, Louisiana, and Delaware 
are explicitly part time, and they do allow for outside employment.  Whether full-time 
commissioners are allowed outside compensated employment is split—some do, but 
many do not.   
 The compensation of commissioners reflects their responsibilities and locations.  
The highest goes to officials in Connecticut, California, Virginia, and Ohio.  The lowest 
tier not including part-time commissioners includes Mississippi, North Dakota, Montana, 
and Nebraska.  The tendency is for populous states with more infrastructure to have the 
highest paid commissioners while mostly rural, sparsely populated states with little 
infrastructure to have the lowest paid.  Compensation of commissioners reflects the 
responsibility of the job.   
 
The Model 
 
The model for the decision follows Sass and Leigh.97 Sass and Leigh develops a 
model that predicts a difference in motorcycle fatalities between states that passed a 
motorcycle helmet law, and those that did not.  This paper applies a similar model to 
differences in price per kWh between state that passed electricity restructuring and those 
that did not.   
The premise for the model is that there are significant differences in the average 
price of electricity across the states that cannot be fully explained by differences in fuel 
costs.  Other factors including the level of competition as a result of restructuring activity 
 
97 Sass 1991 
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are important in determining the average price of electricity across states.  The model is 
designed to determine, based on the structure of legislatures and regulatory bodies, the 
probability that a particular state will pass restructuring legislation. 
Whether a state passes restructuring legislation in a particular year is a binary 
outcome—it either happens or it does not—although in one case, California, legislation 
eventually reverts to the previous regime.  Except in the case of California, it may be 
appropriate to use a regime change model that drops observations once the regime has 
changed.  The regime change model is estimated in the results.   
Theory says that legislators base their decisions on the perceived net benefit of, or 
demand for, a particular proposal.  The result is a probit model: 
ititit uZL 0
* +=  where 



=
0
1
itL if 0
0
*
*
<
	
it
it
L
L
(1) 
where *itL is the net benefit of restructuring legislation in state i and year t. itZ is 
a vector of observed state variables and itu0 an error term. 
The expected price of electricity is modeled as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  ++++= uuXXPE 12222121 (2) 
The 1 and 2 represent constants, 1 and 2 are vectors of slope coefficients, X is a 
vector of exogenous variables, and the subscripts 1 and 2 represent states that enacted 
restructuring legislation and those that did not in the 8 years represented by the data.  The 
 and  terms are the standard normal cumulative distribution and density functions 
evaluated at Z  . ( ) ( ).0Pris1while,1Pris == L7L7 The first two terms represent 
the expected difference in price with the random assignment of restructuring; the final 
term ( )   uu 12 is a measure of the bias caused by non-random selection. 
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Assuming ( ) ( )  ++++= uuDXCBXAPE 12 we can derive the 
coefficients 1, 2, 1, and 2 by adding the coefficients A, B, C, and D to get what we 
need.   
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The expected price with restructuring legislation (PL) and without (PNL) can now 
be estimated.   
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One would expect that the difference in price across states would have some 
effect on whether a state restructured or not.  Following Sass and Leigh, an equation is 
specified: 
( ) itNLLitit uPPZL 0++=  (3) 
where NLL PP and represent price in states with restructuring legislation and price 
in state without restructuring legislation.  Combining equations (2) and (3) the final 
reduced form equation is: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ititititit uuuXXZL 0212211 +++++=  (4) 
To obtain a result, estimate (4) using probit and obtain estimates of the values of  and 
 . Substitute those results into equation (2) and estimate by OLS, incorporating  to 
adjust the covariance.  The predicted difference in prices obtained in (2) is used as an 
explanatory variable in the estimation of (3) by directly predicting expected average 
revenue in the law and no law regime.
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The Explanatory Variables 
 
Shughart and Tollison suggest that the legislative process can be modeled in terms 
of supply and demand.  On the demand side the percentage of customers by class is 
important in determining legislative events.  By default industrial, transportation, and 
"other" customers are grouped in the model.  Industrial customers are intense users of 
electricity and they represent a concentrated interest group.  Commercial customers fall 
in the middle.  While the cost of electricity is a substantial portion of commercial 
customer's budgets, they are a large and diffuse group.  At the other extreme are 
residential customers whose interests are the most diffuse and electricity makes up a 
relatively small portion of their overall budgets.  Despite this, many states have consumer 
advocates who represent the interests of residential customers in rate cases.  Industrial 
and commercial customers have an obvious interest in restructuring legislation designed 
to lower the average price, as is the stated intent of most restructuring legislation.  An 
examination of the legislation yields that most states that have passed or intend to pass 
restructuring legislation have initiated industrial and commercial restructuring before 
residential restructuring. 
While industrial and commercial customers are obvious beneficiaries, residential 
customers and other special interests can exert different lobbying pressure.  The 
consumer advocate may often demand various cost controls in the perceived interest of 
residential customers.  In a few cases the consumer advocate has opposed restructuring 
on the premise that restructuring removes price controls that limited market power of 
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utilities.  Environmental groups, while usually in favor of restructuring, ensure that 
special "green power" restrictions and incentives are imposed on utilities. 
Finally there are the utilities themselves—most importantly the IOUs.  The 
problem of stranded cost recovery has been the major issue in whether or not utilities 
support restructuring.  But as noted, stranded costs more often than not are a smoke-
screen for the true interests of the IOUs—the guaranteed rate of return that the status quo 
grants them.  One commentator has pointed out that stranded cost recovery is 
unnecessary given that the market value of generation assets has been greater than the 
pre-sale estimated value, the value used for stranded cost determination.98 
The supply of legislation and regulation can be explained by the structure of the 
state legislatures and regulatory agencies.  Shughart and Tollison,99 note that for a given 
legislature's size, the ratio of the house to the senate will give an indication of the relative 
power of lobbying within the state legislature.  The greater the ratio, the less likely a 
given law will pass within a legislature.  Assuming that the cost of influencing votes 
increases at an increasing rate as McCormick and Tollison100 suggest, the cost of 
influence is greater the more disparate the size of the legislative houses.  The cost of a 
vote in the larger house is greater than the savings from losing the vote in the smaller 
house, making influencing both houses jointly more costly.   Shughart and Tollison also 
note that the legislature's size can affect the chances that legislation will pass a 
legislature.  The larger the legislature, the less likely legislation will pass because it is 
more difficult for legislators to come to a consensus.  On the other hand, the value of a 
legislator's vote is less in large legislatures.  This makes monitoring legislators relatively 
 
98 Bilas 1999 
99 Shughart 1985 
100 McCormick 1981 
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easy for interest groups and lessens the cost of votes through competition among 
legislators.  The length of the legislative session is another important indicator of the 
probability that legislation will be enacted.  The longer the legislative session, the more 
likely legislation will be passed.  There is simply more time to pass legislation.   
Sass and Leigh notes that there is intransigence in the law.  When a law exists, it 
is more likely that the law will stay in effect in the next year since no action is necessary 
to have the law in the next period.  A lagged binary variable accommodates this effect.  
Similarly, when either a law exists or does not there is a tendency for the status quo to be 
maintained; all legislation is costly to enact in some way.  A +1 variable signifies the 
existence of a law in the previous period; a -1 is assigned to the periods in which there 
was no law in the previous period. 
Regulatory commissions in the regulated environment are responsible for the rate 
of return allowed for utilities, especially IOUs.  For this reason it is expected that the 
structure and rules governing the regulatory commissions within the states would have an 
effect on the price of electricity within the states.  In the model it is the structure of the 
regulatory commissions along with average fuel prices that determine average revenue 
per kWh of electricity.   
For the regulatory commissions, an effect can be expected for several factors.  
The staggering of commissioner's terms is one instance.  Salant argues that the staggering 
of terms between regulatory commissioners and the heads of IOUs can have an effect on 
the allowed rate of return to IOUs.101 Commissioners in their last part of their terms have 
no incentive to allow IOUs to collect on investments in infrastructure because they will 
not be present to reap the benefits from increases system reliability that come with those 
 
101 Salant 1995 
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investments.  Likewise, the managers of IOUs do not have an incentive to invest in 
infrastructure in the last part of their terms because they will not collect on the benefits.  
His analysis finds that the staggering of terms between managers of firms and regulators 
will lead to optimal investments in new capacity, given finite horizons.  Salant's 
conclusions suggest that commissions with staggered terms for commissioners will tend 
to allow for higher returns to investments by IOUs.  The staggering of terms of 
commissioners is used because manager data is difficult to obtain, and because the terms 
of commissioners are staggered, it is more likely that the terms of the commissioners will 
be staggered relative to managers of IOUs.  Higher returns to IOUs translate into higher 
rates, or average revenue, for customers. 
Many commissions have restrictions on post-employment after commission 
members leave office, having the potential effect of favoring IOUs in rate cases and other 
regulatory hearings.  Salant suggests that the opportunity for post-commission 
employment in the private sector could be socially beneficial, leading to more optimal 
regulatory outcomes.  Commissioners with a potential stake in the health of IOUs are 
more likely to allow for higher rates of return than commissioners who are indifferent. 
Given that post-employment opportunities exist, there is potential for corruption 
of the regulator-IOU relationship.  Salant notes that the media, public interests groups, 
and lobbyists heavily monitor the regulatory process, thereby decreasing the potential for 
corruption, but the opportunity still exists.  But given other conditions, it should be 
expected that the larger the commission, the less opportunity there is for corruption and 
the lower we should expect electricity rates.  Also the larger the commission, the less 
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likely a consensus on the level of rates and the more likely commissions will agree on 
low rates. 
The length of the term of office has the effect of reinforcing the tenure of the 
commissioners.  With longer commission terms, the more likely commissioners are to act 
in their own interests, at the expense of the public.  Longer terms also increase the 
likelihood of corruption. 
Whether or not the commission members are elected could have an effect on their 
performance in office.  Besley and Coate102 suggest that elected regulators are more pro-
consumer than appointed regulators.  They point out that political parties are more likely 
to choose regulators that are pro-stakeholder in the regulatory preferences, as opposed to 
pro-consumer.  Pro-stakeholder candidates are more likely to use resources in a way 
favorable to the gubernatorial candidate than pro-consumer candidates.  By being pro-
consumer, it is expected that elected candidates are less likely to allow for rate increases 
than pro-stakeholder candidates.  They also imply that a pro-consumer regulator will be 
less effective when firms can affect the future employment in states with fewer 
constraints on post commission employment.  Mixon finds that states with appointed 
regulators tend to have larger commissions that states with elected commissioners.  This 
is consistent with elected commissions having incentives more closely aligned with 
consumer preferences as opposed to appointed commissions whose preferences are more 
closely aligned with those of the party in power.   
The qualifications of commissioners can have effects on the regulatory outcome.  
Expect that commissioners with a professional background would be better informed or 
qualified to determine what rates utilities should be allowed to pass on.  On the other 
 
102 Besley 2003 
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hand, professionals may be less likely to be pro-consumer, even if elected, given their 
qualifications. 
Minority party representation on a commission would be expected to counter 
tendencies towards regulatory capture.  Savitski looked specifically at the initiation of 
regulation, noting that Republican state administrations were less likely to initiate state 
regulation of utilities.  It should be expected that Republican appointed commissions 
would tend to favor IOUs.  Appointment of Democratic regulators would tend the thwart 
pro-industry regulation.  A Democratically controlled commission would tend toward 
more pro-consumer regulation.  This tendency could be countermanded by a Republican 
on a regulatory commission. 
 
The Data 
 
Using data culled from the Energy Information Agency (EIA), the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), the National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners (NARUC), Council of State Government (CSG), and the internet—a 
dataset was assembled with information about legislatures, regulatory commissions, 
state-level aggregate variables, and cost per BTU for the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia for 8 years beginning in 1996 and ending in 2003.  The District of Columbia 
was later removed from the set because of data irregularities.  Table 3.1 is a summary of 
the non-binary statistics used in the analysis:
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Table 3.1 
Summary Statistics  
Variable Mean 
Standard  
Deviation Min  Max 
Session Length 58.49 52.7 0 210 
House To Senate Ratio 2.9 2.18 0 16.67 
Legislature Size 147.64 59.65 49 424 
Percentage of 
Customers Industrial 
0.005 0.004 0 0.035 
Percentage of 
Customers Commercial 
0.118 0.018 0.083 0.189 
Percentage of 
Customers Residential 
0.868 0.023 0.798 0.911 
Number of Utilities 25.32 38.49 0 184 
Avg Revenue Per kWh 
All Sectors 
7 2.13 3.9 14.47 
Avg Revenue Per kWh 
Industrial 
5.11 1.83 2.74 12.2 
Avg Revenue Per kWh 
Commercial 
7.33 2.05 4.17 15.02 
Avg Revenue Per kWh 
Residential 
8.48 2.31 4.95 16.73 
Number of 
Commissioners 
3.92 1.22 3 7 
Term of Office 5.42 0.94 4 8 
Cost Per BTU 0.09 0.11 0 0.7 
 
In the analysis, average revenue across all sectors was used as the dependent 
variable.  All other measures of average revenue have a similar magnitude.  Average 
revenue from what is described as "other" sources is omitted.  It is uncertain what "other" 
really describes, but it includes transportation and municipal power expenditures.  In 
2002 the classification of transportation and "other" changed.  They became convenient 
to ignore as they made up only a small proportion of total expenditures.  They also 
contained a few outliers. 
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Fuel cost is measure in dollars per BTU.  Across the states they range from very 
low to $0.70 per BTU, more than 7 times the mean.  The year 2003 is a problem because 
cost per BTU was not reported in the EIA data after 2002.   
The legislative data in the analysis is for 2003.  It is assumed that the structure of 
legislatures does not change significantly from 1996 to 2003.  Legislative sessions 
averaged 59 days with a maximum of 210.  Some states alternated legislative session 
length year to year, having longer and shorter session in odd and even years.  Some states 
had no statutory session length.  The effect of these states for a given year is captured in a 
dummy for no session length.  The House to Senate ratio ranges from 0 to about 17.  The 
0 is for Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature.  The 17 corresponds to New 
Hampshire, which has an extremely large House of Representatives relative to the Senate.  
When measuring the effects of House to Senate ratio on legislative outcomes, it is 
important to control for the absolute size of the legislature.  The legislature's size is the 
sum of the House and the Senate in each state.  The largest legislature is New 
Hampshire's with 424 legislators.  The smallest is Nebraska's with 49. 
The regulatory variables are from the year 1996 as published in the NARUC 
yearbook.  Most of the regulatory variables are recorded as 0 or 1 dummy representing 
whether states had elected regulators, whether the position required professional 
qualifications, if the minority party is represented, and if there are any post-employment 
constraints on regulators.  Additional variables include the number of commissioners, 
ranging from 3 to 7, with an average of almost 4.  The length of the regulatory term of 
office ranged from 4 to 8 years, at over 5 on average. 
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The Results 
 
Table 3.2 shows the results of the probit regressions of legislative outcome as a 
function of state legislative variables with the expected difference in price (average 
revenue) and the original probit specification without the expected difference in price.  
The regressions were estimated using random effects, pooled, pooled with restricted 
coefficients, and a regime-switching probit models.  The random effects probit model is 
more appropriate if we assume that there is unobserved variation across states that is 
unique to the state.  Given the relatively small time interval relative to the cross section, 
the random effects estimator may be more appropriate, except that the random effects 
model introduces econometric issues that are currently intractable.  The pooled probit 
assumes that there are no unobserved differences in legislation determination.  It is 
consistent with Sass and Leigh and is the benchmark with which the other models are 
compared. 
The restricted coefficient model comes from equation (4) above.  The  term 
changes if the coefficients are not restricted so that 
NLLNLL 

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where 
( )NLL  =~ and ( )NLL  =
~ . The fifth specification is the regime switching 
model.  Sass and Leigh assume that changes in legislation are difficult but are subject to 
change year after year.  In the case of motorcycle helmet laws, legislation was repealed or 
changed at the behest of motorcyclists in many states.  With the exception of California, 
there was no repeal—per se—in the states that elected to commit to electricity 
restructuring.  But once California reverted to its previous regulatory regime, many states 
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amended their laws to limit desultory effects, limiting restructuring.  Because of the lack 
of reversion, a regime switching model may be appropriate.   
Comparing the first two specifications in column (2), leaving the expected 
difference in average revenue out does not affect the significance of the coefficients or 
their magnitude, with the possible exception the percentage of residential and commercial 
customers.  The effect on the magnitude of the commercial and residential coefficients 
suggests that their influence on legislation is correlated with the expected savings from 
the legislation, or that their effect on the legislature is a function of how much they stand 
to benefit.   
Comparing specifications (2) and (3), there is no serious difference between the 
random effects and pooled model across specifications with respect to the effect of the 
difference in average revenue.  The signs are also consistent, signifying that there are 
probably no significant unobserved state differences to bias the outcome of the 
regression.  Given that the random effects estimate is probably econometrically suspect, 
this is further evidence that it is safe to ignore unobserved effects in the model.  
The best alternative comparison to the pooled model is the restricted coefficients 
model.  Comparing results (2) and (4), there are similar effects with respect to session 
length and House to Senate ratio.  Additionally, the effect of having no session length is 
correct in sign and significant at the 5% level, reinforcing Shughart and Tollison's result 
of the effects of legislature structure and rules on the passage of legislation.  The number 
of utilities is of the wrong sign, but insignificant except in the regime switching model.   
90 
Table 3.2 
Results From the Regression of Legislative Outcome on State Parameters 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pooled 
Probit 
Pooled 
Probit 
Random 
Effects 
Probit 
Restricted 
Coefficients 
Regime 
Switching  
Session Length + 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.009 
 (2.87)** (2.74)** (2.26)* (3.25)** (2.22)* 
No Session Length + 0.34 0.29 0.50 0.50 -1.413 
 (1.23) (1.00) (1.17) (1.96)* (2.95)** 
House to Senate 
Ratio - -0.25 -0.26 -0.32 -0.23 -0.074 
 (2.89)** (2.96)** (2.39)* (2.70)** (0.52) 
Legislature Size ? 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.004 
 (4.81)** (4.86)** (3.32)** (4.53)** (0.73) 
Percent Commercial ? -8.15 -5.90 -5.16 -14.70 -34.199 
 (0.59) (0.42) (0.21) (1.02) (1.88) 
Percent Residential ? 14.45 17.70 24.07 7.75 -23.609 
 (1.33) (1.52) (1.15) (0.66) (1.51) 
Number of Utilities + -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.012 
 (1.44) (1.54) (1.21) (1.36) (2.33)* 
Difference in 
Expected Average 
Revenue -  -0.65 -0.64 -1.27 -0.326 
 (0.81) (0.44) (0.23) (2.58)** 
Constant  -11.14 -14.09 -19.63 -4.76 22.532 
 (1.02) (1.22) (0.95) (0.40) (1.47) 
Observations   400 400 400 400 262 
Number of _state    50   
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
 
While not statistically significant, the increase in magnitude of the percent 
commercial and decrease in magnitude of percent residential coefficients reinforces that 
differences in expected average revenue are correlated with the effect of commercial 
customers on the outcome of legislative decisions.  The fall in percentage of residential 
customers suggests that their diffuse interest is less correlated with changes in average 
revenue.  The increased commercial effect and decreased residential effect is consistent 
91 
with theories of regulation103 that suggest coalitions of winners and losers, with 
commercial interests at the margin, influence changes in regulation.  Residential 
customers, a large and diffuse group, will consistently lose in the competition for 
regulation.  The regime switching model conflicts in some ways with the other probit 
estimates of the effect of legislatures on restructuring outcomes.  The effect of session 
length conflicts with the other estimates, and they are significant. 
 
103 Stigler 1971, Posner 1974, Peltzman 1976, Becker 1983 
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Table 3.3 
Estimated Coefficients of Variables In Average Revenue Regressions 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
Pooled 
Probit 
Random 
Effects 
Probit 
Restricted 
Coefficients 
Regime 
Switching  
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Staggered Terms For 
Commissioners + -0.111 -0.13 -0.231 -0.096 
(1.52) (1.82) (3.87)** (1.40) 
Number of Commissioners + 0.023 0.023 0.017 0.025 
 (1.82) (1.86) (1.57) (2.31)* 
Term of Office + 0.032 0.037 0.061 0.038 
 (1.81) (2.15)* (4.11)** (2.54)* 
Requires Professional 
Qualifications - -0.029 -0.03 -0.042 -0.056 
 (0.91) (0.94) (1.68) (1.99)* 
Minority Party Represented - -0.127 -0.127 -0.075 -0.12 
 (3.32)* (3.38)** (2.76)** (3.85)** 
No Post-Employment 
Constraints + -0.046 -0.034 -0.077 -0.249 
 (1.33) (0.99) (2.44)* (7.64)** 
Elected - -0.182 -0.187 -0.186 -0.152 
 (3.88)* (4.07)** (4.76)** (3.57)** 
Cost Per BTU + 0.636 0.644 0.31 0.279 
 (3.41)* (3.52)** (2.63)** (2.26)* 
U ? 0.14 0.225 0.169 -1.756 
 (1.07) (1.78) (1.46) (6.85)** 
Constant  1.73 1.712 1.849 1.888 
 (14.69)** (14.94)** (19.43)** (17.69)*
Mean Difference in Average 
Revenue (cents/kWh)   0.209 0.208 -0.154 2.626 
Observations  400 400 400 400 
R-squared   0.34 0.33   0.36 
Absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%   
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The results of the regression of expected average revenue across all classes of 
consumer on the cost per BTU and the regulatory variables for the law and no-law states 
is in Table 3.3.  The < term compensates for the bias introduced by the correlation of the 
error terms in the law and no-law cases with the iid error term.  To not take this step 
would cause the difference in average revenue between the law and no-law cases to be 
biased.   
The differences in results (1) through (4) in Table 3.3 are a result of the which 
model is used to estimate results (2) through (5) in Table 3.2.  There appears to be no 
significant difference between the pooled and random effects models, results (1) and (2), 
further suggesting that there are no unobserved effects, allowing us to ignore the dubious, 
random-effects specification.  The coefficients of everything but the < term are used to 
calculate the expected difference in average revenue in the law and no-law regimes for 
results (2) through (5) in Table 3.2.  
With respect to the regulatory determinants of average revenue from electricity 
across states, cost per BTU of energy is the most obvious and important determinant of 
this proxy for price.  Additionally minority party representation and popular election are 
of the correct sign and statistically significant in (1), (3), and (4).  Term of office is 
significant in (3) and (4), but not in column (1).  The coefficient for the staggering of 
terms for commissioners is the wrong sign in all cases, but only statistically significant in 
column (3).  This could result from commissioners' inability to conspire in the regulatory 
process.  The other regulatory variables have the correct sign but are also not statistically 
significant.  The columns (2) through (5) from Table 3.2 are based on the assumption that 
the decision to enact restructuring legislation is dependent on the expected difference in 
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price with and without the legislation.  Based on the assumption that there is little to be 
gained from assuming the random effects are necessary, (2), (4), and (5) represent the 
results of assuming the dependence of legislation on expected difference in price.  The 
negative coefficient in all specifications indicates that the greater the difference in 
expected price between the law and no-law cases, the more likely the legislation is going 
to be adopted.  The assumption of legislators is to expect no-law price to be greater than 
the price with the law, and hence their difference to converge or be negative.  The states 
implementing restructuring pay about $0.0021 per kWh more based on the probit 
estimate (2) and $0.0263 per kWh based on the regime switching estimate (4).  Estimate 
(3), with the restricted coefficients, suggests a different outcome.  By restricting the 
coefficients, the estimate for the explained difference changes so that the states that did 
not implement restructuring, the no-law states, pay a premium of $0.0015 per kWh. 
The legislature structure has some strong results.  The longer legislatures are in 
session, the more likely they are to enact restructuring is a significant result.  The result is 
consistent with the theory of the effect of session length on the adoption of laws.  The 
ratio of House to Senate size is consistent with legislation being more difficult to pass in 
states with a greater disparity in legislative house size.  Additionally, the legislature size 
is significant in determining the passage of legislation.   
Column (4), the restricted coefficient model, is the most fundamentally correct 
specification for this data.  The pooled unrestricted estimates conform closely, but the 
regression must compensate for the  term, as in the restricted model.   
Unfortunately the percentage of commercial and residential customers does not 
seem to influence the passage of legislation.  Neither does the number of utilities in the 
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regulator's jurisdiction.  Most importantly, the difference in expected price as proxied by 
the difference in average revenue does not have a statistically significant effect on the 
passage of restructuring within these models, despite having the appropriate sign.  This 
does not mean that significant savings cannot be had by restructuring.  The model also 
currently omits a variable to account for pro-industry or pro-consumer differences in 
legislation.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The model presented makes an argument for the simultaneous determination of 
legislative outcomes using electricity markets.  Because neither legislators nor regulators 
work in a vacuum, it is expected that legislators react to the regulators' decisions, through 
prices, in the legislature's decision to pass restructuring, especially given the exogenous 
determination of input costs and regulatory structure by state.   
Unfortunately it cannot be determined from the data that legislators are reacting to 
expected prices as their signal.  But it is likely that legislators do observe some other 
aspects of the regulatory process and react accordingly. 
While it cannot be determined that legislators are reacting to expected differences 
in price when determining their votes on restructuring legislation, there is evidence that 
the structure of the legislature has a significant effect on legislative outcomes.  
Additionally, the structure of the regulatory commissions is important in determining 
prices in the regulated market, using average revenue as a proxy. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
MODELING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES: 
THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 
 
A wave of mergers and acquisitions in the electric power industry occurred from the 
late nineties through 2003.  The wave occurred concomitantly with restructuring at both 
the state and federal level.  Changes in federal rules instituted by FERC probably had 
some effect on the incentives of firms to engage in mergers and acquisitions.  But the 
major wave of restructuring occurred in response to changes in state regulatory structure.  
There is evidence, albeit weak, that firms responded in the non-restructuring states to 
restructuring in other states.  Through a model and general examination of the data, 
changes in the industry through mergers and acquisitions will be shown to have occurred 
in response to changes in regulatory structure in the states that restructured. 
The electric power industry emerged throughout the country in pockets.  Generation 
was on a small scale, usually serving cities.  Being dispersed, individual utilities 
developed in isolation.  As this occurred, states began to regulate the industry, attempting 
to fix the duplication problems and other industry irregularities.  But like any industry, a 
certain amount of scale is necessary for the efficient production of the good or service.  
Up through the twenties, rampant mergers and acquisitions occurred in the industry, 
driving down the average cost of power but leading to increased concentration.  New 
interstate utility holding companies developed.  These new holding companies were 
unregulated due to constitutional limitations on the individual state's ability to regulate 
interstate commerce.104 After the stock market crash, when the financial malfeasance of 
the interstate holding companies became apparent, the federal government stepped in. 
 
104 Energy Information Agency 1993 
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The Roosevelt administration halted the wave of mergers and acquisitions occurring 
in the industry.  The passage of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
(PUHCA) was the major legislation that ended consolidation in the electric utility sector.  
PUHCA limited the relationship that regulated firms had with their regulated subsidiaries 
while empowering the states to take a more active role in the intrastate regulation of 
utilities. 
Beginning in the late seventies several events occurred to cause legislators to 
reconsider the regulation of gas and electric utilities.  Fossil fuel costs rose, and gas 
turbine technology became more efficient.  The Three Mile Island incident brought 
renewed scrutiny to the nuclear power industry, increasing the costs of using nuclear 
power technology.  Both of these events changed how firms operated in the market.  As a 
result, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) to encourage 
the more efficient use energy sources in the United States.  PURPA created a class of 
producers called qualifying facilities that enhanced the stock of generation, leading to 
more efficient and diverse production of power from combined-cycle sources105.
Beginning in the late eighties, great changes in technology precipitated changes in the 
regulation of utilities.  The Energy Policy Act of 1992 empowered FERC with the tools 
to open up energy markets without giving it explicit authority to mandate retail 
wheeling—the sale of energy across non-contiguous buyers and sellers.  States responded 
by enacting legislation that allowed generators greater flexibility in the competitive 
production of electricity.   
 
105 Combined-cycle generation refers to generation other than from dedicated generators, usually industrial 
generation from the waste heat of industrial processes.  The excess heat is used to run generation that is 
used or sold to utilities. 
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Throughout the nineties and into the first decade of the 21st century, firms have 
merged and acquired competitive businesses with the ultimate goal of increasing their 
competitive viability in the face of a changing regulatory environment.  The present paper 
attempts to show that legislative changes have an effect in driving mergers and 
acquisitions in the electric power industry by decreasing the market value of firms in 
restructuring states.  As firm value declines in the restructuring states, firms attempt to 
recoup lost market capital by merging or acquiring competing firms. 
Mitchell and Mulherin have studied the conditions under which firms will merge 
when faced with industry shocks.  Their hypothesis maintained that corporate takeovers 
represented the least cost means of coping with industry-specific economic shocks106.
They studied the effect of industry-specific changes in regulation or market structure.  
Looking specifically at the 1980’s they found that takeover activity occurred 
disproportionately at the industry level.  The industries they observe with the greatest 
takeover activity also had the greatest fundamental shocks—or shocks such as 
deregulation, technological change, or others that caused fundamental industry change.  
They found that the most robust results were in industries with the greatest stock market 
performance.  While Mitchell and Mulherin studied a variety of industries, they avoided 
industries that experienced significant state and federal regulation, notably the electric 
power and banking industries.   
Other authors have looked at vertical mergers in the electric utility industry.  Vertical 
mergers have been called convergence mergers to describe mergers between upstream 
natural gas and downstream electric generators.  While this paper does not directly 
examine these mergers, they are worth mentioning.   
 
106 Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996 
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Brennan107 analyzes vertical mergers by noting that vertical mergers are an 
“oxymoron;" they limit the provision of complements, rather than substitutes, as in 
traditional horizontal mergers.  The market power that is a problem is horizontal in the 
input market.  Brennan notes that convergence mergers are neutral if the generator is gas 
fired—the gas producer already has market power.  Convergence mergers can eliminate 
the double marginalization: the existence and exercise of market power in vertical 
markets by multiple, independent firms.  By eliminating the duplication of market power, 
the merger raises profits for the market participants and decreases price for consumers, 
increasing overall market efficiency.    
Hunger108 reaffirms Brennan's conclusions.  Hunger looks at the merger review 
process and concludes that traditional merger analysis does not adequately capture the 
ability of firms to “raise rivals cost,” establishing the necessary conditions for firms to 
raise rivals cost by merging with upstream firms.  It notes that if a gas company has 
substantial market power in the upstream market, the electric generator can create infra-
marginal rents for non-gas fired generators in the downstream market by the exercise of 
market power in the upstream market.  This is in addition to the ability to capture rents in 
the upstream market with the naked exercise of market power by gas producers.  It does 
not matter if the generator owns gas generators or not, just as long as he benefits from 
higher electricity prices. 
Mergers and acquisitions in the electric power industry were different from mergers 
in other industries in many ways.  Regulators scrutinized mergers much more in the 
electric power industry due to multi-tiered regulation.  Not only does the federal 
 
107 Brennan, 2001 
108 Hunger, 2003 
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government through PUHCA limit the scope of mergers—into complementary industries 
such as gas—states often entered to limit the scale of mergers.  But state regulation does 
not prevent the federal government from limiting scale.  The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) still maintains oversight of interstate mergers in the utility industry.   
In the late eighties the regulatory environment began to change for the industry.  The 
first significant change occurred with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 
(EPAct).  This piece of legislation authorized FERC to begin the process of deregulating 
electricity markets at the federal level.  With Order 636, FERC mandated the unbundling 
of transmission and distribution from generation.  The practical effect of the order was to 
allow for the separation of transmission and distribution costs from generation costs.  
With Order 888 FERC instituted the “open access” rule: generation was no longer limited 
to large co-generators or transmission and distribution owning utilities.  By allowing for 
the separation of transmission and distribution, states were now free to pass unilateral 
restructuring without interference from federal regulators. 
With Order 888 and restructuring within the states, utilities faced a regulatory 
environment unlike any in the last 60 years.  As Mitchell and Mulherin had shown, with 
changing costs and regulations, industries adapt by instituting corporate restructuring: 
mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers.  From 1996 through 2005 the electric power 
industry went through a wave of corporate restructuring unlike any since prior to the 
passage of PUHCA.  Not only did private utilities begin acquiring smaller utilities and 
spinning off transmission and distribution assets as mandated by many states, but new 
classes of power producers—many of whom did not own either transmission or 
distribution assets—entered the market.   
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The data for this study was derived from COMPUSTAT financial data, Value Line 
investor surveys, FERC, and Energy Information Agency (EIA) data collected from 
power plants across the country.  The COMPUSTAT data is from 1996 through 2004.  
The study ignores years prior to 1996 as there were few mergers or acquisitions prior to 
1996.  The COMPUSTAT data was also limited to firms that had SIC numbers consistent 
with firms in the electricity generation, transmission, or distribution industry.  Firms that 
specialized in the production or distribution of natural gas were excluded, even though 
their inclusion would be consistent in the estimation of the benefits or mergers and 
acquisitions that is hypothesized.  They were omitted because there were no EIA data on 
those firms.   
FERC must approve all interstate mergers and acquisitions; it has the most complete 
compendium of mergers and acquisitions and therefore is the source for all approved 
mergers and acquisitions analyzed.  FERC also maintains a database of financial 
information in a proprietary format.  Unfortunately FERC does not acquire financial data 
on all IOUs, only the largest, so the COMPUSTAT data was also used.  The market value 
regression uses the absolute change in sales and lagged liability to asset ratio for all of the 
firms who took part in a merger or acquisition from 1996 to 2003.  By using absolute 
change, the study picks up the effect Mitchell and Mulherin observe, that changing 
industry sales may induce firms to merge or acquire other firms in response to positive 
and negative industry shocks. 
This study borrows data from a previous study109 of the effects of state restructuring 
on price, or specifically average revenue, based on Sass and Leigh110. The model 
 
109 Davis 2006 
110 Sass and Leigh 1991 
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estimates the probability of a merger based on the estimated value of the merger relative 
to not merging and the absolute percentage change in sales and liability to asset ratio: 
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Mit represents the value of the merger to an acquiring firm.  If the merger has a 
positive net value then it proceeds with a binary value of 1.  If a merger in a given year 
has a negative value, then we observe no merger and a binary value of 0.   
The vector Zit is a collection of firm-specific characteristics such as the absolute value 
of the percentage change in sales and liability to asset ratio.  Absolute percentage change 
in sales will indicate whether the firm is facing a shock that affects sales, either positively 
or negatively, within the industry.  When facing a shock, firms are more likely to engage 
in restructuring activities either to mitigate negative shocks or to take advantage of a 
shock by acquiring assets that were previously uncompetitive.  
The lagged liability to asset ratio gives an indication of whether a firm is attempting 
to merge or acquire another firm in a previous period.  If a firm is planning a merger or 
acquisition, then the firm will issue new debt in order to acquire a firm or merge in the 
next period. 
Another determinate of the attractiveness of a merger is the potential gains from the 
merger.  Equation (2) estimates the expected value of the natural log of market 
capitalization by state as a function of the standard normal probability density function 
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() and standard normal cumulative density function () and a vector of determinants of 
firm value by state (X).   
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )

uuX
XE
1222
2121tionCapitalizaMarket 
+++
+=
(2) 
 
Included in the vector of state specific effects are heating and cooling degree days for 
a year, the cumulative deviation in heating and cooling degree days for a year, the 
number of utilities in the state as of 1995, the average cost per Btu of energy within the 
state, and whether the state enacted restructuring legislation in a given year.   
Heating and cooling degree days per year are used as a measure of energy demand in 
each state.  A heating or cooling degree day is calculated for each degree difference in 
temperature from 65 degrees Fahrenheit.  The cumulative heating and cooling degree 
days in December is used as a measure of total heating and cooling degree days for the 
year.  The cumulative deviation in December is used to determine the total cumulative 
deviation for the year. 
Each observation is an instance of a firm listed in the COMPUSTAT data that could 
be reconciled with the CRSP data by id number—a combination of PERMNO and 
CUSIP reconciled originally in a separate list. 
Equation (3) is the probit estimate of firm specific effects including the difference in 
market capitalization between firms that do not merge (C1) and those that do (C2). 
 
( ) ititit uCCZM 021 ++=  (3) 
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Equation (4) is the probit estimate substituting the expected value derived in 
equation (2) above:  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ititititit uuuXXZM 0212211 +++++=  (4) 
 
Estimation requires estimating equation (4) to get estimates of  and . Equation (2) 
is then estimated using the values of  and  to determine the coefficients 1, 2, 1, and 
2. These coefficients are then used to determine the expected difference in market 
capitalization from merging where the subscript "1" is for non-merging firms and "2" 
represents merging firms. 
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Table 4.1 is the results of models (1) and (3) above: 
Table 4.1 
Regression of Probability of a Merger or Acquisition 
 Expected Sign W/o Diff in Mkt Cap With Diff in Mkt Cap 
Absolute Change in Sales      +  -2.033  -2.245 
(1.43) (1.62) 
Lagged Sales of Firm + 0.174 0.097 
 (0.28) (0.16) 
Lagged Negative Sales 
Dummy - -0.297 -0.217 
 (0.75) (0.55) 
Lagged Liability to Asset 
Ratio - -0.931 0.12 
 (0.41) (0.05) 
Difference in Market 
Capitalization -  0.052 
 (2.30)* 
Constant ? -0.481 -0.096 
 (0.30) (0.07) 
Mean Difference in Market Capitalization -27.886 
(Non Mergers Mkt Cap - Mergers Mkt Cap)  
Observations  190 190 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
The predicted sign for absolute percentage change in sales and lagged sales effect are 
positive.  To capture an effect, the absolute value is taken to determine a total shock.  
While the lagged sales are consistent with mergers and acquisitions occurring in response 
to an unexpected shock, the small test statistic suggests the result is unimpressive.  The 
negative sign on current period absolute change in sales implies that an increase in 
absolute change in sales for a year decreases the probability of a merger or acquisition in 
the current year.  Another interpretation is that an expected change in sales will decrease 
the probability of a merger or acquisition in the coming year.  Mitchell and Mulherin 
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observe that sales growth have no effect on merger or acquisition activity, but changes 
relative to other industries do have an effect, and shocks have an effect.  Because this 
study only looks at the electricity industry, changes with respect to other industries are 
unobserved.  The results do not confirm Mitchell and Mulherrin's result that shocks do 
affect merger or acquisition activity.   
The negative result for current year shocks suggests that an expected shock decreases 
the probability of a merger or acquisition in the current period, assuming that firms plan 
mergers and acquisitions a period ahead.  If negative shocks are controlled for, they 
perfectly predict 62 observations of non merger or acquisitions activity.  This result 
suggests that negative shocks do not drive merger or acquisition activities in the data, 
reinforcing the conclusion that firms do not respond to expected negative changes in 
business activity by merging or being acquired.  The statistically insignificant coefficient 
on the lagged negative sales dummy implies that unexpected negative shocks have no 
effect on merger or acquisitions activities. 
The sign for lagged liability to asset ratio is positive when changes in market 
capitalization are accounted for and negative when they are not, implying that increases 
in the issuance of debt in a year correspond to increases in merger and acquisition 
activities in the next and debt structure is correlated with changes in the expected market 
value of the firm.  This is consistent with the intuition that firms use debt to finance 
mergers and acquisitions as proposed by Blair111. Unfortunately no statistically 
significant effect is observed on mergers and acquisitions. 
The difference in market capitalization from equation (3) is included.  The coefficient 
of the expected difference is positive.  This is inconsistent with a hypothesis that as the 
 
111 Blair, Margaret. The Deal Decade. Brookings Institution Press.  1993 
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expected difference in market capitalization rises, the more likely firms are to engage in 
merger and acquisition activity.  The result does not support a hypothesis that IOUs 
engage in merger activity to increase market value, relative to the expectation based on 
the value of other firms in the industry.  Finally, the expected market value of the non-
merging firms is on average $28 million less than the merging firms, supporting a 
conclusion that mergers increase market value.  But $28 million is a very small difference 
considering the value of even the smallest IOUs is in the billions. 
Table 4.2 lists the coefficients from the expected market capitalization regression.    
The only significant effect is for the total deviation in heating days in a year.  The 
coefficients on all other variables are statistically insignificant.   
Cost per BTU of fuel has a weak negative effect, consistent with rising energy costs 
decreasing firm value.  The number of heating and number of cooling days are also of the 
expected sign.  As heating days increase, demand for electricity should fall in areas that 
use heating intensively, as electric heating is less efficient for intensive use than 
alternatives.  Cooling days are also of the correct sign, indicating that in warm climates, 
the intensive use of air conditioning, and therefore electricity, would contribute to higher 
market value of firms.  Cumulative deviations in heating and cooling days should have 
positive effects on firm value due to the costs associated with adapting to changes in 
temperature in warm climates, and the cost of using short-run, electric heat in cooler 
climates.   
Restructuring is of the correct sign, although not statistically significant, but it is 
close.  The restructuring variable uses state of incorporation to determine whether the 
firm was affected by restructuring in the states or not.  The use of state of incorporation 
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as the determiner of restructuring is valid because utilities were required under PUHCA 
to register in the state in which they provided service and there were geographic limits to 
mergers and acquisitions under the prevailing regulation.112 
Table 4.2 
Regression of Market Capitalization on State Determinants of Firm 
Value 
 Predicted Sign Coefficient 
Cost Per BTU - -0.437 
(0.49) 
Number of Utilities - 0.001 
 (0.16) 
Heating Days - -0.000212 
 (1.29) 
Cumulative Deviation in 
Heating Days + 0.0014 
 (2.06)* 
Cooling Days  + 0.0002613 
 (1.39) 
Cumulative Deviation in 
Cooling Days + -0.0012 
 (0.86) 
Restructured + 0.45  
 (1.61) 
U ? -16.841 
 (1.91) 
Constant ? 14.937 
 (37.94)** 
Observations  190 
R-squared  0.15 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
112 EIA 1993 
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There are other reasons why firms in the electric utility industry may merge or 
acquire other firms.  There is substantial evidence that the firm restructuring is occurring 
in response to changes in regulation instituted by FERC under the Energy Policy Act of 
1992 (EPAct).  The model also looked at restructuring specifically in the states, but did 
not include mergers and acquisitions across industries, specifically electric and gas 
mergers. 
Table 4.3 
 Mergers and Acquisitions by State of Incorporation: 1997 to 2004 
Year State of 
Incorporation 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
State 
Totals 
CA 2        2
CO 2   1     3
DC 1    1    2
DE 2    1    3
FL    1     1
IA 2 1  2     5
IL 1  2   1  1 5
IN    1 1    2
KS   1      1
KY  2  1     3
MA   4 1     5
MD 1  1      2
ME    1     1
MN 1   2     3
MO 1  1 3  1  1 7
NC 1 1  2  1   5
NJ     1    1
NV   3 2     5
NY 1  2 2 3    8
OH 3   1 1    5
OR 1   1  1   3
PA   1      1
SD    1     1
TX 1   1     2
VA   1      1
WI 2 2       4
Year Totals 22 6 16 23 8 4 0 2 81 
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Table 4.3 is mergers and acquisitions by state from 1997 to 2004.  Due to data 
limitations the table represents a more complete set of mergers than in the model.  1997 
was an important year for mergers and acquisitions in the industry with a total of 22 
individual firm actions, mostly with other IOUs, for a total of merger or acquisition 
transactions of 11 or more, if gas electric mergers are included.  1997 coincides with the 
first big push for industry restructuring within the states.  1999 and 2000 were also 
important years for mergers and acquisitions in the industry, with 16 and 23 individual 
firm actions.  Both years correspond with substantial changes in state level restructuring. 
 
Table 4.4 
Mergers and Acquisitions: Restructuring States 
 
Year Restructuring 
State 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
State 
Totals 
CA 2        2
DC 1    1    2
DE 2    1    3
IL 1  2   1  1 5
MA   4 1     5
MD 1  1      2
ME    1     1
NJ     1    1
NV   3 2     5
NY 1  2 2 3    8
OH 3   1 1    5
PA   1      1
TX 1   1     2
VA   1      1
Year Totals 12 0 14 8 7 1 0 1 43 
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Table 4.4 is mergers and acquisitions in restructuring states.  The years 1997, 1999, 
2000, and 2001 were the most active for mergers and acquisitions in restructuring states.  
After 2001, merger and acquisitions activity falls off, possibly as a response to changes 
states made in reaction to California's restructuring problems. 
Table 4.5, merger and acquisition activity in non-restructuring states, indicates that 
merger and restructuring activity was not limited to restructuring states, undermining the 
hypothesis that state restructuring was driving mergers and acquisitions.  But even in the 
non-restructuring states activity was clustered in 1997 and 2000.  This could indicate that 
firms in the non-restructuring states were reacting to regulatory uncertainty, the 
possibility of restructuring in their state of incorporation, or that they were reacting to 
merger and acquisition activity in restructuring states. 
 
Table 4.5 
Mergers and Acquisitions: Non-Restructuring States 
Year  
State 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
State 
Totals 
CO 2   1     3
FL    1     1
IA 2 1  2     5
IN    1 1    2
KS   1      1
KY  2  1     3
MN 1   2     3
MO 1  1 3  1  1 7
NC 1 1  2  1   5
OR 1   1  1   3
SD    1     1
WI 2 2       4
Year Totals 10 6 2 15 1 3 0 1 38 
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Another indication of what may be driving restructuring in the states is in Figure 4.1.  
Figure 4.1 is average market capitalization for firms in restructuring versus non-
restructuring states.  Prior to 1999, in the middle of the merger and acquisitions wave, 
IOUs in non-restructuring states enjoyed a billion dollar premium over IOUs in the 
restructuring states.  Firms in the restructuring states, where pressure to merge or acquire 
or be acquired was greater due to changes in the structure of regulation, were increasing 
market value relative to IOUs in the non-restructuring states.  After 1999, and consistent 
with Table 4.5, IOUs in the non-restructuring states embarked on a wave of restructuring, 
attempting to catch up to firms in the restructuring states.  In the restructuring states, 
mergers and acquisitions began in 1999 and continued through 2001, as seen in Table 4.  
Firms in the restructuring states had a premium of almost a billion dollars in market 
capitalization after 1999.  
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Figure 4.1 
The results of the empirical model, with the weak effect of restructuring driving mergers 
and acquisitions, combined with the evidence from Tables 4.4 and 4.5, that mergers and 
acquisitions in the restructuring states were leading those in the non-restructuring states, 
and the change in market capitalization in the restructuring versus non-restructuring 
states, indicate that state restructuring possibly drove the wave of mergers and 
acquisitions in the electric power industry. 
Given the regulatory conditions under which IOUs operate, it is difficult to explain 
well what drives mergers and acquisitions across firms and states through time.  But we 
know they occur.  Any explanation would have to include the incentives for the IOU to 
merge or acquire other firms.  It is well understood113 that the manager has an incentive 
to increase value for the shareholder as well as potentially consolidating his management 
 
113 Jensen 1976 
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position.  It is reasonable to believe that the manager will make those decisions that 
increase the market value of the firm while faced with regulatory constraints imposed by 
the states. 
Mitchell and Mulherin have shown that firms when faced with regulatory change and 
market pressure engage in merger and acquisition activity to mitigate the negative market 
effects.  Blair showed that firms use debt to finance merger and acquisition activity.  
Combined these explain some of what drives merger and acquisition activities among 
IOUs.  But this does not explain particular state-specific incentives to engage in these 
activities.  This paper addresses those concerns by estimating differences in market value 
of firms that engage in mergers and those that do not.   
The paper shows that changes in market capitalization can explain the occurrence of 
mergers and acquisitions, while climate and the enactment of restructuring legislation can 
weakly explain some of the difference in market value that potentially drives the 
incentive to merge or acquire.  Looking at trends in the timing of mergers and 
acquisitions between restructuring and non-restructuring states suggests that firms in the 
restructuring states were responding to restructuring, while firms in the non-restructuring 
states were responding to IOU's responses in the restructuring states.  Management may 
perceive benefits to maintaining market value relative to other IOUs in the industry, or 
they perceive structural change as an opportunity to grab assets that were undervalued 
prior to major industry restructuring.  Either scenario is plausible but irrelevant.  The 
important result is that firms seem to respond to restructuring by changing firm structure, 
suggesting that regulation in the industry created incentives that were undone in the wave 
of restructuring occurring from 1996 to 2003. 
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